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ABSTRACT
It is in the act of performing its vital functions that 
Montaigne seeks to comprehend the self. In this study the 
author has endeavored to distinguish the element which is in 
the act of performing the complicated operations of human 
conduct.
It is suggested that Montaigne's approach is essentially 
a negative one which seeks the elimination of extraneous 
elements from the basic self. He accomplishes this in vari­
ous stages which are successively more revealing of his 
inner composition.
The author of the Essais divides the self into two 
general parts which are most intimately connected, but which 
represent entities each distinct in its own right. The 
entity which is termed the "âme" is considered to be more 
representative of the essential self, and it is in terms of 
this that the author discusses its composition.
The âme is considered a stable entity because Montaigne 
always treats it as an established fact, something which can 
be described, an element which has a "maistresse forme." It 
is further suggested that his method of self-examination is 
also indicative of this fact.
The âme is essential to the existence of the individual 
and is naturally in search of freedom. It possesses a need
iv
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for expression and for communication, the satisfaction of 
which will determine the internal success of the individual.
The self effects no essential changes in the course of 
its life, but rather develops in a direction which should be 
determined by innate tendencies, the source of which is un­
known. These tendencies make each individual unique and 
provide the sole criteria for measuring the success of the 
individual.
An examination of the âme in terms of its functions 
discloses the fact that Montaigne holds the exercise of free 
will and creativity in the highest positions of importance. 
Other functions are; the exercise of jugement, governing, 
legislating, thinking, the asimilating of knowledge, communi­
cating and the expressing of emotions, with the exception of 
heterosexual love.
The âme exercises supreme authority over its own inte­
rior world, but it is ineffective in its efforts to control 
the exterior. With its internal supremacy, however, it has 
all that is necessary to lead a happy existence.
A distinction is made between the good self and the 
virtuous self, and it is with the former that Montaigne 
chiefly concerns himself. Characteristics of the good self 
are gentleness, humanity, sincerity, orderliness, tranquility, 
coincidence with the "universal order" of nature, a kind of 
mediocrity, aloofness, and adaptability. The good man will, 
in all probability, be a wise man, but he may not necessar­
ily be a virtuous man, for virtue lies in a different but
V
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not unpleasant domain.
The term "esprit," as Montaigne uses it, although diffi­
cult to define, generally represents the âme in motion or 
perhaps, specifically, the âme in the act of being creative. 
This "esprit" is exempt from the tranquility of the whole 
self and is destined to be ever in a state of activity. It 
is this element in the composition of the self which jeop­
ardizes the well-being of the whole entity but which, on the 
contrary may be the greatest asset of the self.
In the final analysis, there remains an area of the self 
which generally defies definition and which is as yet too 
evasive to be described. This is the completely subjective 
self which is apparently the ultimate seat of the self- 
conscious. It is the final observer which can not in turn 
be observed.
VI
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CHAPTER I 
IN SEARCH OF THE PARTS 
It takes only a very superficial glance through the 
Essais to discover that the words most often used to describe 
the functions of the self are âme, esprit, jugement, entende­
ment , corps, and lastly moi. All matter pertinent to the 
self appears to be discussed in terms of these concepts.
Since the author made it plain that it was his self of which 
he was speaking, he would lead one to believe that it was in 
terms of these concepts that he considered his own being.
For the most part, any non-physical activity is in these 
terms, and he tells us that he discusses all the varied sub­
jects in order to exercise his self, to provide the reader 
with the opportunity to view workings of this object in a 
multileveled situation. He is using these subjects to dem­
onstrate his esprit, jugement, and entendement.̂  He knows of 
no other way of defining these than in terms of how they 
function. But after all, is this not in the very nature of 
Montaigne's approach to life and.philosophy? He is interest­
ed only in what is functional. All else he considers utter 
pedantry, a meaningless acquisition of knowledge. If a given
'Que sont les Essais? des milliers de faits con 
serves par la mémoire, et éclairant le jugement." Fortunat 
Strowski, Montaigne (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1931),
p. 212.
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concept is not operative, it is meaningless. He must exer­
cise his moral judgement (one reason for his great like for 
Plutarch). In any discussion based on the material contained 
in the Essais, there arises the pressing problem of sincerity 
and reliability. Does Michel de Montaigne always express his 
self? What about those first books wherein Montaigne was 
simply (according to Villey) a collector of the ideas of 
others? What about Dowden's contention that Montaigne may 
have retouched the literal facts to satisfy his artistic 
instinct to construct the ideal ego?̂  Or again Villey's 
claim that at the time in which he wrote his first essays,
Montaigne was writing from the point of view of enthusiasm
2rather than from knowledge of himself. What about that
daring statement which Villey makes?
"Montaigne a beau dire que son but en écrivant 
les Essais est seulement de contempler à son 
ayse 1'ineptie et l'estrangeté des chimères 
et monstres fantastiques que lui engendre son 
esprit et lui enfaire honte à luy mesme, il 
a 1'intention de publier ces chimères, il 
veut êstre auteur, il veut qu'on parle de luy."^
At first glance, these claims might appear shocking and 
invalidating of any study such as this based upon the 
material contained in the parts so criticized, but we think
^Edward Dowden, Michel de Montaigne (Philadelphia 
@ London: J.B. Lippincott Company, [1905]), p. 65.
^Pierre Villey-Desmaserets, Les Sources and 
l'Evolution des Essais de Montaigne (Paris: Hachette and
Cie., 1908), I, 58.
^Ibid., II, 60-61.
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that this need not be the case. Villey maintains that the 
early Essais only demonstrate Montaigne's intelligence, 
which represents only a very small portion of his moi.̂  We 
feel that he missed a very important point here. It is 
that Montaigne was exercising his jugement in his choice and 
arrangement of these items. This certainly would not repre­
sent a small part of the moi of Montaigne, but what he would 
probably consider to be one of the most relevant aspects.
In the final analysis what he wants is to be able to act in 
the best possible way in any given set of circumstances.& 
Actually if one properly understands the technique of 
Montaigne, it will be recognized that this rather impersonal 
phase of his writing career is very helpful and even neces­
sary if the reader is to get the full picture of what is to 
be accomplished. Michel de Montaigne does not set out to con­
struct his self. His sole task is to demask that which would
Sibid., p. 263.
Pierre Moreau, Montaigne ; 1'Homme et 1'Oeuvre (Paris; 
Boivin and Cie., 1939), p. 67. In contrast to villey's 
statements about the first Essais, we quote the following 
from Moreau's book:
"Surtout, on ne peut admettre que le texte grec 
ou latin qu'il happe au passage ait servi de point 
de départ à sa pensée de suggestion intime a sa 
méditation personelle. La méditation, la pensée 
sont venues d'abord; l'exemple, la référence ont 
été appelés après coup au hasard d'une lecture. 
Souvent les variantes des essais permettent de 
suivre ces dépôts successifs de phrases empruntées 
ou d'anecdotes étrangères sur une page dont le fond 
primitif était fait d'expérience directe, des 
souvenirs vécus."
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be an expression of what lies hidden within. He himself
points out that most of us do not live out our own selves,
but we act out what has been obtained elsewhere.
"Nostre ame ne branle qu'à credit, liée et 
contrainte à 1'appétit des fantasies d'autruy, 
serve et captivée soubs 1'authorité de leur 
leçon. On nous a tant assubjectis aux cordes 
que nous n'avons plus de franches allures."?
And so it is very pertinent that we see him while he is still
completely wearing the mask. The exposition will be complete
from beginning to end. It will be interesting to take note
that his future will be formed by what he will have learned
about his self in the past, that is to say that his present
self will determine his future self.
It would, therefore, appear to us that this aspect of 
sincerity in Montaigne is not open to doubt, even though it 
must be granted that there is ample reason to believe that 
he was writing to be read by others than himself, while 
making the contrary statement. Perhaps a compromising state­
ment might be made, namely that he knew and intended that he 
should be read, but that he placed his own personal interests 
above those of acquiring and maintaining a reading audience. 
However this may be, we are still being supplied with the 
examples of Montaigne's moi at work.
?Michel de Montaigne, Oeuvres Completes (Bruges: 
l'Imprimerie Sainte-Catherine, 1965), p. 150. [All further 
references to the Essais will be given with the title of the 
essay and the page on which it is found; this edition will 
be the source.]
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Strowski would agree with Dowden's accusation that
Montaigne was preoccupied with art form in his composition
and arrangement of the E s s a i s . & But this is not to discredit
the sincerity or the accuracy of the statements and accounts
which he gave. On the contrary, Strowski sees this art, this
arrangement, as being essential to the accurate communication
of his ideas. After all, does not art represent the attempt
on the part of a refined and sensitive intellect to arrive
at truth in a manner which is more concise and more revealing
than is the normal means of human communication? We might
even say that all form of communication is to some degree art,
and that the more artistic the medium, the more accurate the
portrayal and the comprehension. But let us quote from
Strowski who has framed this concept in terms which lay bare
the essence of the matter.
"Vous ne pouvez pas chez Montaigne modifier 
l'expression sans toucher à l'idée; et à 
mesure que l'expression gagne en beauté à 
travers les diverses variantes, 1'idée gagne 
d'autant en exactitude et en profondeur.
C'est donc que l'art est, en Montaigne, 
gouverné par la pensée, à la pensée pour 
support; que la pensée est l'essentiel pour 
Montaigne."9
We, therefore, believe that there need be no real concern 
as to whether or not sincerity exists, or how much sincerity 
exists in his works as long as it is accepted generally that 
it is there. This overall sincerity appears to be present.
^Strowski, 0£. cit., p. 12.
^Ibid., p. 14.
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One more problem appears to require a decision before 
we analyze the moi and that is whether or not a detailed 
knowledge of the date of composition for each discussion is 
in order. While it is desirable and interesting to know the 
various dates of composition, it is not entirely necessary 
that we spend a great deal of time in the temporal aspects 
of the moi because we are seeking stable elements rather 
than an evolutionary description. We shall, however, not 
divorce this study from the time element but shall consider 
it as being of secondary importance. The main interest in 
the time of composition would be that of ascertaining when 
the author became aware of a certain element and when he 
incorporated it into his self concept. This would still be 
of dubious value since there would exist no proof that such 
concepts were not present prior to any given date. It would 
only tell us that they were not expressed prior to that time. 
An example is the rather obvious fact that Montaigne became 
bolder toward the end of his life. His personal references 
become much more frequent and revealing. We could certainly 
not say that he never considered these aspects before.
I'̂ iat we might be able to say would be simply that if he did 
not speak about such and such an experience in such and such 
a manner it might have been because he was afraid to do so. 
We accept Pierre Villey's research in this matter as an 
authoritative source upon which to base any reference neces­
sary as regards time.
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In Book III, chapter XII of "De la Phisionomie," 
Montaigne writes "Je me laisse aller comme je suis venu, je 
ne combats rien; mes deux maistresses pieces vivent de leur 
grace en pais et en bon accord. . . ."10 Obviously he has 
here divided his self into two distinct parts. Quite obvi­
ously one is the body, and the second is, in all probability, 
following the trend of the discussion, the soul. He is con­
sistent in this rather general division throughout his work. 
He writes of the passions of the âme as opposed to the 
passions of the corps. He has the âme and the corps help­
ing and defending one another. He reflects on the various 
influences the one has upon the other. He distinguishes 
between a "corps en santé" and an "âme en santé." These are, 
of course, the two normal general divisions into which man 
generally considers himself divided, and this division need 
not be discussed at length.
As we seek to establish a definite cleavage between the 
âme and the body, it becomes necessary that we have some 
verification that these do indeed represent completely 
separate entities, and are not just another aspect or manner 
of speaking of one single concept. This distinction must 
be such that we may be able to ascertain characteristics 
which are properties of each individual in its own right if 
we are to be able to render a description of one or the 
other elements in such a way that a distinct definable
^®"De la phisionomie," p. 1,037.
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picture of one or both might be drawn in its own right. A 
somewhat similar situation would be that of studying the 
makeup of water. We know that there exist two distinct ele­
ments , each of which may be described according to its own 
properties and characteristics, but which only in the 
closest physical union create the substance which is called 
water and which itself becomes a new entity, as it were, 
created out of the union of its two components. Montaigne 
does this quite readily for us. Although he would easily, 
indeed hasten to concede that one may not in actual fact 
separate the parts and still be left with a man, he makes a 
definite cleavage between the body and other aspects of the 
self.
"Chacun sqait par experience qu'il y a des parties 
qui se transient, dressent et couchent souvent 
sans son congé? Or ces passions qui ne nous 
touchent que par 1'escorse, ne se peuvent dire 
nostres. Pour les faire nostres, il faut que 
l'homme y soit engagé tout entier; et les 
douleurs que le pied ou la main sentent pendant 
que nous dormons, ne sont pas à nous.
This is, of course, from the famous VIth chapter of Book II,
"De 1'exercitation." In time, it dates back to the first
edition of 1580, but it is clear that he kept this concept
to the time of his death for the following quotation, which
was not present in his 1588 edition, V7as published in his
1595 edition:
. "Car je vous donne à penser s'il y a une seule 
des parties de nostre corps qui ne refuse à
ll"De 1'exercitation," p. 356,
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nostre volonté souvent son operation et qui 
souvent ne l'exerce contre nostre volonté.
Elles ont chacune des passions propres, qui 
les esveillent et endorment, sans nostre 
congé."1%
What we have here is the definite acceptance of a cleav­
age between the self and that which houses it, the body.
The body is even able to function without the presence of 
the self. Montaigne reinforces this idea when he points out 
that the soul is also quite able to function without the body. 
In the 1588 edition he writes:
"Quand nous songeons, notre ame vit, agit, exerce 
toutes ses facultez, ne plus ne moins que quand 
elle veille; mais si plus mollement et obscuré­
ment, non de tant certes que la differance y soit 
comme de la nuit à une clarté vifve; ouy, comme 
de la nuit à l'ombre; là elle dort, icy elle 
sommeille, plus et moins."13
Here one can readily distinguish two living entities.
Montaigne, however, goes much further in this development
of the two entities. In that episode in Montaigne's life
wherein he describes his falling from his horse, the reader
finds a rather ample discussion of the separation of body
and soul and of their ability to act independently of one
another. In his account of this event, he says that the
actions he took on behalf of his wife were not from his own
self, but from certain activities which the senses undertook
on their own. He also maintains that, judging from his own
experiences and from what was later related to him about his
13"De la force de l'imagination," p. 100.
13"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," pp. 580-81.
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actions', people who are in the final agonies are in reality 
not suffering such a horrible pain as their bodies would make 
it a p p e a r . 14 All the moaning and groaning is some kind of 
reflex action which the body takes because of the affliction 
of one of its members. To him, the soul appears to be too 
shaken to take cognizance of what is happening around it.
One of the best indications which Montaigne has given
us about the division of the human into two parts, the âme
and the corps, is that rather controversial statement he
makes in his essay "De l'affection des peres aux enfants."
". . .il semble qu'il y ait bien une autre pro­
duction venant de nous qui ne soit pas de 
moindre recommandation: car ce que nous engen­
drons par l'ame, les enfantemens de nostre 
esprit, de nostre courage et suffisance sont
produicts par une plus noble partie que la
corporelle, et sont plus nostre. . . ."15
Here is why he would rather give birth to a good book, for
this would be more a representation of his self. Note the
phrase plus nostre. He here considers the corps and âme
separately and has even assigned a higher value to the âme.
Why? Because it is the self. Strangely enough, Montaigne
has here almost relegated the body to the position of being
a mere tool, a mere shell for the âme, the self. As a
matter of fact, he refers to the body as 1'escorse. T h i s
does not mean, however, that the âme of the real self is not
14"De 1 *exercitation," p. 356.
l^"De 1'affection des peres aux enfants," p. 380. 
lG"De 1'exercitation," p. 356.
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affected by the condition of the body.
In order to be able to discuss what appears to be at 
least a higher phase or element of the self, that which rep­
resents the elusive element, the comprehension of which was 
a lifetime endeavor with Montaigne, we must clarify the posi­
tion of that fully physical aspect, the corps. Without a 
clear understanding of its position of importance and its 
essential functions, one would not be able to maintain a 
proper perspective in the discussion of the other elements 
involved.
We must say first that the corporal factor in this 
makeup of the self was an absolutely necessary one for any 
being to be classified a man. In the "Apologie de Raimond 
Sebond" Montaigne makes an issue of this, pointing out that 
the Christian faith has as one of its major dogmas the 
resurrection of the body so that it might share in the 
rewards or punishment of the soul. His argument seems to 
be^hat it was a man, a full man who was responsible for the 
acts for which he was facing judgment and that as such the 
body was to be held equally accountable with the soul for 
its conduct. He even appears at times to believe that the 
body represents the major culprit in this union due to the 
great propensity which the senses have toward leading the 
whole man toward evil.
It was, indeed, by this corporal partner that Michel 
de Montaigne most often felt himself thwarted. He writes 
"Si le corps se gouvernoit autant selon moy que faict I'ame,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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nous marcherions un peu plus à nostre aise."!? This repre­
sents the really uncontrollable element in the partnership. 
The sage can control his âme, he can prepare it so that it 
will always be happy and tranquil. He may fortify himself 
against all the passions which assail" it, he may garnish it 
and nourish it with all his gleanings from study, yet for 
the body he can do little. It is a creature, almost entirely 
at the disposal of nature and fortune. The closest he was 
able to come to some control in this area was to prepare his 
âme to withstand all the sufferings and misfortune of this 
unfortunate half and even at times to be able to relish some 
of its so called "painful sensations." He lets his reader 
know that, when under the attack of the stone, it is not 
his soul or self which is moaning and. groaning and even 
weeping, it is only his poor body, and that he does not even 
attempt to refrain from such manifestations of pain since it 
is natural for the body to act thus. The body must learn to 
accept its unfortunate condition since it is unable to change 
it. We do not wish to give the impression that the âme was 
completely above being influenced or even being thoroughly 
disabled by the ills of the body. This would be very far 
from the truth. He mentions that as his body slows down with 
age, so too does his esprit;!̂  and in the essay "De 
I'experience" he writes "L'ame est frappée de l'ardeur d'une
!?"De I'experience," p. 1,077.
ISngur des vers de Virgile," p. 821,
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fievre, et atterrée d'une epilepsie, et disloquée par une 
aspre micraine, et en fin estonnée par toutes les maladies 
qui blessent la masse et les plus nobles p a r t i e s . "19
One must take note that he does not say that there is 
any question of suffering here, just that the functioning of 
the âme is impaired.
It is from the preoccupation with aging that we are 
able to draw the best example of the close conjuncture of the 
corps and the âme. Montaigne seems to see the âme aging 
along with its partner the corps, even surpassing it in the 
effects of the years. "Elle (old age) nous attache plus de 
rides en l'esprit qu'au visage; it ne se void point d'ames, 
ou fort rares, qui en vieillissant ne sentent à l'aigre et 
au moisi. L'homme marche entier vers son croist et vers son 
décroist."20
Many persons have alleged that old age is a friend to 
the virtue of the soul, that the maladies which one suffers 
in his later years are a natural aid to keeping him from 
evil ways. With this concept Montaigne found himself in 
no wise in agreement. It was his belief that as the body 
became more susceptible to illness and decrepitudes, so 
too did the soul.^l He felt that what happened was that the 
âme went from the less vicious physical vices to the more
19"De 1'experience," p. 1,073. 
20"Du repentir," p. 795.
21"Ibid."
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destructible evils once it became unable to engage in the 
physical. So it was that a person who was not virtuous in 
his youth would be less likely to be so in his old age.
A further indication of the close conjuncture of the 
âme and the corps is the inability of the former to receive 
any knowledge except by way of the senses. This fact makes 
the âme completely reliant upon the corps for all of its 
relationships with the outside world. "Les sens sont nos 
propres et premiers j u g e s . "22
Such a manner of thinking would cancel out the concept 
of natural law as it was held in Montaigne's day. Indeed, 
he makes every effort in the Essais to demonstrate the 
regional and temporal relativity of all human morality, and 
establishes sensations as the only real and certain informa­
tion obtainable.
Montaigne observed that it was in the realm of the phy­
sical that man lived and so it would be in the areas of
physical importance that man must learn to exercise his
jugement, and in which he must bring to fruition the quali­
ties which he developed in his âme. "La vie est un mouvement 
materiel et corporel, action imparfaicte de sa propre 
essence, et desreglée; je m'emploie à la servir selon 
elle."23 Since this was his concept of the composition of
life so he undertook to live it, and he relates further that
22"De l'art de conférer," p. 908. 
23"De la varité," p. 967.
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he is completely material in his life and only seeks to live 
in conformity with the world of the r e a l . 24
Another aspect of Montaigne's thinking which, while not 
of great importance in itself, shows the importance which he 
placed upon the physical aspect of the self. This is his 
opinion that a crippled body was indicative of a crippled 
âme. He hastens to add that in the case of La Boétie, who 
might at first glance be considered ugly by some, the ugli­
ness was only superficial. But notice what he has to say 
about an ugly deformity. "L'autre, qui d'un plus propre non 
s'appelle difformité, est plus substantielle, porte plus 
volontiers coup jusques au dedans. Non pas tout soulier de 
cuir bien lissé, mais tout soulier bien formé montre 
1'intérieure forme du pied."25
We terminate this discussion of the corps and its rela­
tionship to the âme, and of the relative importance of the 
âme over the corps with the following words from Montaigne. 
"Aristippus ne defendoit que le corps, comme si nous n'avions 
pas d'ame; Zenon n'embrassoit que l'ame, comme si nous 
n'avions pas de corps. Tous deux vicieusement."^^
In the 1580 edition of the "Apologie de Raimond Sebond," 
Montaigne wrote; "cette mesme piperie que les sens apportent 
à nostre entendement, ils la reçoivent à leur tour. Nostre
Z^Ibid., p. 978.
25"De la phisionomie," p* 1,035. 
25"De I'experience," p. 1,087.
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ame par fois s'en revanche de mesme."2? Note the contrast 
in the person used when discussing the âme and the corps.
The third person pronoun, the "other" person pronoun, is used 
when referring to the corps, while the first person posses­
sive adjective, the "self" possessive, is used when speaking 
of the âme. The last edition of 1595 has added here: "ils
mentent et se trompent à l'envy." Montaigne has drawn a 
picture of a veritable civil war here. Perhaps this is some­
thing of the struggle he had in mind when he wrote :
"Mais nous sommes, je ne sçay comment, doubles 
en nous mesmes, qui faict que ce que nous 
croyons, nous ne le croyons pas, et ne nous 
pouvons deffaire de ce que nous condamnons."2°
Again in the edition of 1595 in the essay "De Democritus et 
Heraclitus," Montaigne made an addition wherein he said that 
there existed such a cleavage between the body and the soul 
that the soul could have no assurance that any information 
which it received through the senses was true.^^ And so it 
goes. We would like to conclude this discussion of the con­
cept of complete separation with the following quotation from 
the "Apologie."
"Or il est vray-semblable que, si l'ame sçavoit 
quelque chose, elle se sqaurait premièrement 
elle mesme; et, si elle sçavoit quelque chose 
hors d'elle, ce seroit son corps et son estuy, 
avant tout autre chose."30
3’̂"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 530. 
33"De la gloire," p. 603.
33"De Democritus et Heraclitus," p. 290, 
30"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 543.
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The important words here are, of course, hors d*elle. The 
separation is quite complete.
From this point we find ourselves faced with the prob­
lem of whether or not Montaigne seriously considered the 
self or the person to be synonymous with the term âme. Book 
III, chapter XII finds him speaking of Hannibal, Scipio, and 
Socrates. He is in the process of drawing a comparison 
between weak people and strong people. He refers to them in 
terms of "les ames fortes" et "les ames faibles." Well in 
advance of this he has spoken of "ames moins genereuses"^^ 
when referring to the people of Thebes; in his essay "Des 
Prognostications," he makes mention of the leader of the 
people as "ames principesques; and, to give another ref­
erence, he writes of people who die mocking death and its 
henchmen as "ces viles ames de buffons."33
In his essay Du repentir, Montaigne wrote:
"Je ne puis asseurer mon object. Il va trouble 
et chancelant, d'une yvresse naturelle. Je le 
prens en ce point, comme il est, en l'instant 
que je m'amuse à luy. Je ne peints pas l'estre.
Je peints le passage: non un passage d'aage
en autre, ou, comme diet le peuple, de sept ans 
en sept ans, mais de jour en jour, de minute en 
minute. Il faut accommoder mon histoire à 
l'heure. Je pourray tantost changer, non de 
fortune seulement, mais aussi d'intention.
C'est un conterolle de divers et muables accidens
12. 31"Par divers moyens on arrive à pareille fin,"
32"Des prognostications," p. 45.
3 3"Que le goust des biens et des maux dépend en bonne 
partie de 1'opinion que nous en avons," p. 52.
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et d'imaginations irrésolues et, quand il y 
eschet, contraires; soit que je sois autre 
moymesme, soit que je saisisse les subjects 
par autres circonstances et considerations. . .
Si mon ame pouvoit prendre pied, je ne 
m'essaierois pas, je me resoudrois; elle est' 
toujours en apprentissage et en espreuve."^^
He points out here that the secret to understanding and defin­
ing the self is understanding the âme, for it is that element 
which will not stand still, which refuses to take root. We 
feel that for a man who was avowedly in search of the self, 
the fact that he was able to give this declaration of the 
elusiveness of the self, and in the same paragraph say that 
the âme is always without a foothold and that if he could 
anchor it, he could resolve the problem, would seem to us to 
be a very blatant equating of at least a major portion of the 
self with what he termed âme. He is striking a somewhat 
discouraging note here, but there are times when he feels that 
he knows himself. This inability to seize upon his subject 
appears to us to arise from the inability of the first person 
to look upon itself, for it then becomes the first person or 
the self, looking upon something else which is then the third 
person and no longer the self. Montaigne was very correct 
in not seeking to analyze himself. By adhering closely to 
the technique of following the results of this object, the 
passage of this object, he was able to analyze it by its 
effects.
34"du repentir," p. 782.
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And so it is that the soul of Montaigne seeks to look 
indirectly for that which cannot be seen, itself. It is 
forced to experience its own being through the senses, which 
are, as Montaigne pointed out, a very unreliable source of 
information.
Being able to divide the self into two rather large 
parts, or perhaps actually to limit it to one, the âme, with 
a physical tool, the corps, is obviously not sufficient for 
we are confronted with the fact that there is something which 
has that ability to look upon its own being. Montaigne con­
stantly had his âme under examination, but does not this 
very activity require the presence of an examiner, a fact 
which immediately revives the first and second person situa­
tion, or even, and more often than not, a first and third 
person situation. This in turn places the reader back at 
the beginning, for the examiner becomes the moi and the thing 
examined takes on the characteristics of a shell or at the 
very least only the expression of something even more remote.
Thus far, it appears that we have three basic elements 
in no way equally important, i.e., not at all equal or the 
same as the moi, but in which we may view the moi as it 
expresses itself. We must, however, discuss the moi in terms 
of the âme, for this is what Montaigne in fact did. It must, 
however, never be forgotten that there existed an examiner, 
the first person which was in some way embodied so to speak 
by the âme, which was in turn made physical by the corps. 
However, all these divisions must be included in any
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
composite consideration of Montaigne. For he did not believe 
that a full man existed without their presence.
The first person, the essence of the examiner, seems to 
be beyond our ability to examine with the hope of arriving 
at any great certitudes. We will, however, discuss this 
self-conscious aspect in at least general terms later. As 
for a description of Montaigne's physical self, we feel that 
this has been amply done, and in a very open manner by the 
author himself. We shall remain in quest of that elusive 
invisible aspect. Henceforth we shall mainly concern our­
selves with what the author of the Essais termed âme. We 
shall attempt to discern its functions and its parts, if one 
may say this of the ame. We shall indeed relate these to 
their corresponding physical aspects where they do exist 
and where a comparison would serve to place the subject 
under observation in sharper and more exact detail.
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CHAPTER II 
THE ÂME
In this chapter we will undertake to study the âme as 
Montaigne treated it in his Essais.1 The word "treated" 
should be given special notice because we do not know that 
he was always conscious of the fact that he was discussing 
it in the manner in which he actually did. What we have done 
with the advantage of hindsight is to review and collect his 
references to this term and try to ascertain whether or not 
any reoccurring principles were established, if not overtly 
or intentionally, then at least de facto from the approach ^  
used and from the manner in which the author chose to discuss 
this concept as well as from the way in which he built it 
into the Essais.
This particular approach on our part appears to be well 
in accord with what the author of the Essais set out to do, 
for he tells the reader that by exercising his "jugement" on 
the various topics which he has selected, he chooses to 
reveal himself. It is up to the reader to exercise his own
lit is quite natural, in our opinion, that the term 
âme have a somewhat specialized meaning in certain instances, 
since the complete concept of âme is rarely involved in any 
given act.
We do not feel that this variable nuance is a deter­
rent to the study of the whole concept, since the total of 
the various aspects will reflect the entire idea.
21
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jugement to glean the necessary information from the 
discussions.
It is necessary, for this kind of study, that at the 
very outset it be determined whether there existed something 
stable; something stable enough to be classified and de­
scribed. This would have to be so in spite of the statement 
which Montaigne made that he was not describing a being, but 
its passage. It is precisely from the "passage" that we hope 
to find enough clues and evidences to allow us to reconstruct 
the being.
As was mentioned in the first chapter, Montaigne was a 
material person. Thus it is that we should expect a physi­
cal treatment of the concept âme. This kind of discussion 
is found in abundance, yet whenever there is a physical 
description given, it is generally used in reference to some­
thing which is already established in existence and which 
can in some way be acted upon. He speaks of getting the 
âme in condition, "roidir I'ame,"^ he speaks of making im­
pressions on the âme;3 of preparing the âme for the attacks 
of life;4 of attaching knowledge to the âme ;  ̂he speaks of
2"De l'institution des enfants," p. 152.
3p i d ., p. 214.
"De la coustume et de ne changer aisément une loy 
receue," p. 109.
4"Que philosopher c'est apprendre à mourir," 
pp. 89-90.
5"Du pedantisme," p. 139.
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the âme as being "boiteuse"^ throughout the Essais. So we 
see that while he is painting the passage, he is describing 
something which expresses itself in this passage.
This idea of some entity passing through the years and 
demonstrating its presence through its deeds is a very impor­
tant concept in Montaigne. He insists that this creature, 
strange though it may be, must be allowed to take its course, 
it must be free, completely free in its endeavor to express 
itself. "OÙ que I'ame soit empeschée, elle y est toute."? 
Again it can be readily seen that if an âme is to be impeded, 
it is absolutely necessary that there be some entity there 
which can be restrained.
Striking a more personal note, he says that if his âme 
were ever made to lose its footing, it would never rise again, 
so sensitive is it to i n j u r i e s . 8  The concept of falling is, 
to be sure, a very physical one. If his âme were as vaporous 
as has been suggested, it appears odd that he should be so 
concerned about its stability. To emphasize this point, it 
can be demonstrated that he sought to insulate himself during 
his lifetime against any such eventuality.9 This lifetime 
concern should indicate certainly, that while he was unable
Gibid., pp. 140-141.
?"De la solitude," p. 233.
8"Du repentir," pp. 787-788.
9"Que philosopher c'est apprendre a mourir," pp. 
89-90. "Le corps, courbe et plié, a moins de force à 
soustenir un fais; aussi a nostre ame: il la faut dresser
et eslever contre l'effort de cet adversaire."
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to get hold of the object, he recognized its presence.
In the very important essay "Du repentir" Montaigne
comes very close to saying outright that there is definitely
something very stable about the self. We quote:
"Regardez un peu comment s'en porte nostre 
experience: il n'est personne, s'il s'escoute,
qui ne descouvre en soy une forme sienne, une 
forme maistresse, qui luicte contre 
l'institution, et contre la tempeste des 
passions qui luy sont contraires."10
This "forme maistresse" we shall find to be very important
in determining the education and growth of the self.
One last quotation which renders the âme an almost tan­
gible element is to be found in this excerpt from the essay 
"De l'Institution des Enfants:"
"Je voudrois qu'il corrigeast cette partie 
(the tendency of the instructors to hammer 
the arts into their students), et que de belle 
arrivée, selon la portée de l'ame qu'il a en 
main, il commençast à la mettre sur la montre, 
luy faisant gouster les choses, les choisir 
et discerner d'elle mesme."H
Here the reader readily sees Montaigne equating âme with 
the person of the student, and also presenting it as some­
thing which can be dealt with, which can even be molded, 
although it should not be molded, but allowed to move along 
at its own inclination.
Aside from actual references to the âme as a stable 
element, we are able to find another manifestation of this
10"Du repentir," p. 789.
ll"De l'institution des enfants," p. 149.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
belief in Montaigne's constant concern for consistency.
Montaigne demands that a good âme be consistent in its 
12action. Is it that the true âme is not demonstrating 
itself if there is no consistency? Or does it signify 
Montaigne's desire for self-control which would manifest 
itself in a consistent self?
It becomes important now that we have defined the self 
as a describable entity that we understand as fully as pos­
sible the technique which Montaigne used to ascertain the 
makeup of this entity.
We have already pointed out in the first chapter the 
negative character of this search, that there existed the 
concept of unmasking an entity which was already in existence, 
if not actually, then potentially.
Professor Lowndes has written of the Essais :
"As Montaigne understands it, this "recueille­
ment," this possession of the soul is chiefly 
negative— lies in freedom from all constrain­
ing obligations, from all absorbing ties, from 
narrowing aim or limiting prejudice.
And to give a quotation from the author himself:
"Nostre ame ne bransle qu'à credit, liée et 
contrainte à 1'appétit des fantasies d'autruy, 
serve et captivée soubs l'authorité de leurleçon."14
l^"De la praesumption," p. 636.
1 q^Mary E. Lowndes, Michel de Montaigne (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1898), p. l22.
14"De l'institution des enfants," p. 150.
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To understand the situation as Montaigne understood it, 
we must see the âme as something discernible, an entity quite 
capable of being understood if only its real appearance, real 
emotions, real desires could be excavated from all the great 
accumulation of restrictions handed down through the ages.
To him the âme or the self was enslaved until it became 
aware of the restrictions with which it found itself burdened.
We should like to express another method of looking at 
the technique of the Essais, one which is not new in itself, 
but which does not appear to have yet been applied to the 
Essais. I am referring here to the opinion which is held by 
certain philosophers that man's intellectual life is not a 
question of the self assimilating external objects to itself, 
but rather quite the contrary. What the man in quest of 
self-knowledge does is to seek to acquire a greater con­
sciousness of his existence by differentiating himself from 
all that exists around him.^^ In other words man knows him­
self not by seeking to immerse himself in the whole of being, 
in the universe around him, but by seeking out means of 
separating himself from what he is not. He knows that he is 
somehow connected to the "universal order of things" but he 
also knows that he is not the universal order of things, he 
knows that he is not all being for he is able to distinguish 
existence apart from his own. Yet, as in the case of Michel
l^Leslie Dewart, The Future of Belief (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1966), pp. 90-91.
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de Montaigne, he is not exactly certain of the area of exis­
tence which is properly his. It appears that there is no 
way in which one can know himself from the start. He is so 
overwhelmed by everything contained in his environment that 
he must gradually and slowly put it all to the test, at 
first not to find out who he is, but to find out who or what 
he is not. Only after he has been able to remove some of this 
great mass of extraneous existence does he find rays of in­
sight into his own being. "Qui se donnait ne prend plus 
l'étranger fait pour le sien: s'aime et se cultive avant
toute autre chose: refuse les occupations superfues et les
pensées et propositions inutiles.
We feel that the various stages of Montaigne's develop­
ment reflect this attitude of his. In his early years he 
became a stoic. This period represents the very beginning 
of his search for self-identity. He chose the only appar­
ent way of facing so difficult an existence, he elected the 
impassive attitude of the Stoics. He enters into pyrrhonism; 
he has found a void which he has himself created by seeking 
to differentiate himself from his environment. Finally, in 
the third book he knows himself and there we feel that he 
does indeed know himself. The tone of this last book is such 
that, in originality and straightforwardness of self- 
expression, it far surpasses the first two books. He says
^°Frederik F. Jansen, Sources Vives de la Pensée de 
Montaigne (Copenhagen: Levin and Munksgaard, 1935) , p. 94.
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that he has become fixed, that form has passed into sub­
stance.^? Actually, it appears to us that what he is saying 
is that he has finally discovered his substance. He has 
ascertained what he is not and has reached the point of 
knowing what he is.
His endeavor, then, will be to expose. His technique 
will be to expose by means of acting or functioning in as 
many areas as possible. It was his belief that one essen­
tially betrayed himself and that his make-up became apparent 
as he reacted under given conditions. "Tout mouvement nous 
descouvre."18 This exposure is brought about as the result 
of his removing the acquired characteristics which have 
masked the real self.
All this, of course, brings us back to the statement 
that although Montaigne felt his own self to be in constant 
motion there had to be some idea of the self as a fixed 
entity, for what sense would it have made for him to have 
spent so much time uncovering, retrieving, and freeing, if 
there were nothing there upon which he could lay his hands 
in the first place: "Si on ne se descharge premièrement et
son ame du fais qui la presse, le remuement la fera fouler 
davantage."1̂
l?"De mesnager sa volonté," p. 9 8 8 .
18"De Democritus et Heraclitus," p. 2 9 0 .  
18"De la solitude," p. 2 3 4 .
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Since the âme is, then, some entity which can in a way 
be grasped and which can in some manner be described, we are 
nov7 able to look for characteristics and attributes which 
Montaigne ascribed to his own âme (self).
To Montaigne, the term "gme" meant that which was essen­
tial to the existence of the object in question. When the 
âme has been rendered, the living person is dead. This con­
cept of âme was not limited to living beings, but was applied 
to events and objects as well, a fact which gives us a 
clearer insight into the meaning of the term. We quote 
from Book II "Apologie de Raimond Sebond" where he is speak­
ing of the Trojan War:
"L'envie d'un seul homme, un despit, un plaisir, 
une jalousie domestique, causes qui ne devroient 
pas esmouvoir deux liarangeres â s ' esgratigner, 
c'est l'ame et le mouvement de tout ce grand 
trouble."20
Also, very often when referring to great men whose lofty
deeds cause us to admire their non-corporeal qualities, he
will employ the term "âme."
"Les autres vertus ont eu peu ou point de mise 
en cet aage; mais la vaillance, elle est devenue 
populaire par noz guerres civiles et en cette 
partie il se trouve parmy nous des ames fermes 
jusques à la perfection, et en grand nombre, si 
que la triage en est impossible à faire."21
Likewise when referring to people whose spiritual qualities
are not particularly admirable, he uses the term "âme."
20"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 453. 
21"Du démentir," p. 646.
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"C'est aux petites ames, ensepvelies du pois 
des affaires, de ne s'en sçavoir purement 
desmesler, de ne les sçavoir et laisser et 
reprendre."22
When he speaks in such terms he appears to be implying 
that such persons are by nature great, by nature good or 
bad; the implication being that their entire makeup was 
permeated with the particular qualities in question, not only 
their physical expressions, but their innermost being. In 
other words he is saying that they are essentially thus. We 
can see then that one qualification for the âme is that it 
be the essence of the self. If the âme were not present, the 
self would cease to exist. This is a rather obvious and 
common concept, so we will leave it at this point.
The self is, or at least can be free. We may even say 
that it must be free. This is one of the main threads which 
run throughout the Essais. It is a force which holds them 
together from the beginning to the end. Montaigne is truly 
in quest of the self, but he is just as much in quest of 
freedom.
". . . II me semble que toutes façons escar- 
tées et particulières partent plutost de folie 
d'affectation ambitieuse que de vraye raison; 
et que le sage doit au dedans retirer son ame 
de la presse, et la tenir en liberté et puis­
sance de juger librement des choses."23
We find now that the technique which Montaigne used to ■ 
study himself, to find himself, had a dual effect, for as he
22"De 1'experience," p. 1,088.
23 ^"De la coustume et de ne changer aisément une loy
receue," p. 117.
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cleared away the obscurity of extraneous interventions he 
was able also to free himself from their effects and from 
any hold which they might have had on him.
He calls for a withdrawal, but a withdrawal to where?
He answers this question for us himself when he writes; 
"Nature nous a mis au monde libres et desliez nous nous 
emprisonnons en certains destroits. The âme must with­
draw to a state of freedom, a state which is not only 
attainable by it, but which is natural to it, in fact, a 
state which is necessary to its well-being.
This freedom to which the self is called is far reach­
ing and not limited to any single aspect of its existence.
It demands that the self be ever on its guard against in­
volvements which cannot be defended as absolutely necessary, 
and those accepted must necessarily be very few in number. 
This involvment represented one of the dangerous pitfalls 
to the then modern man, everything seemed important to his 
well-being, and especially during Montaigne's last years, to 
his very existence upon this earth. Despite the difficulties 
of the times, he adamantly demands the least involvment pos­
sible. "II faut mesnager la liberté de nostre ame et ne 
1'hypothéquer qu'aux occasions justes; lesquelles sont en 
bien petit nombre, si nous jugeons sainement."25 He is 
almost monastic in his outlook on human involvments. This
24"De la vanité," p. 950.
2^"De mesnager sa volonté," p. 981.
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opinion that he held accounts for his reluctance to accept 
the office of mayor of Bordeaux. It accounts as well for 
his attitude toward his father's involvement in his old age.
Once one had become involved in some endeavor this did 
not mean that he lost himself in the endeavor. To the con­
trary, he must be ever conscious of the distinction which 
existed between the man and the office. Montaigne had 
little sympathy for those who, as it were, "brought the 
office home with them." "C'est aux petites ames, ensepvelies 
du pois des affaires, de ne s'en sçavoir purement desmesler, 
de ne les sçavoir et laisser et r e p r e n d r e . "^6 He makes cer­
tain that the reader knows that Montaigne and the mayor of 
Bordeaux were not one but two. He claims that he was the 
better mayor for it.
Montaigne seems to have been concerned with freedom, 
even physical freedom, more than one could construe as normal, 
He cried out that he was a citizen of the world and that he 
would be made most unhappy if he should come to know of the 
smallest area of the world to which his entrance was barred. 
This feeling was even more applicable to his own country.
He felt that if ever he were barred from any part of France 
by those in authority, he would leave immediately.His 
dislike for any kind of confinement went to such extremes 
that he was unwilling to be held long by a book, or even a
^^"De 1 'experience," p. 1 , 0 8 8 .  
27Ibid., p .  1 , 0 4 9 .
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chair. Apparently he was unable even to think unless he
were moving. It was for this reason that he was lax in the
most menial responsibilities. He simply refused to give up
any freedom, no matter how small, unless it was found to be
absolutely necessary that he do so. This is probably the
reason for his withdrawal to the Tower; he wished to be free
from the demands of the court. 8̂
But there is a far greater freedom which the âme must
seek, and that is freedom from the natural oppression of its
own self. It must somehow find the means to live under the
oppression of its own passions, instincts, fears, desires,
shames, and to withstand the blows of fortune. He says:
"C'est icy la vraye et souveraine liberté, qui 
nous donne dequoy faire la figue à la force et 
à 1'injustice, et nous moquer des prisons et 
des fers."29
Of course this was written when he was trying stoicism 
as the answer to this particular problem, but he held this 
opinion even after he had given up the stoic practice and 
actually found the answer, not in wearing the mask, but in 
being himself.
In 1571, Michel de Montaigne decided to retire from 
worldly pursuits and to seek peace and tranquility on his 
estate. He converted a tower into private quarters— a chapel, 
a bedroom, and a library— where he intended to spend the re­
mainder of his life in study and meditation. Although he did, 
in fact, leave the tower many times for public service and 
travel, he always considered it to be his primary abode, and 
it was there that he spent the greater part of his free time 
composing the Essais.
2^"Que philosopher, c'est apprendre à mourir," p. 90.
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Another characteristic of the âme is its urgent need for 
expression. We are making a distinction at this point 
between expression, which we will discuss immediately, and 
communication, which we will discuss later on. By expression 
we mean the outpouring of internal tendencies, needs, 
desires, fears; the actualizing, if you will, of as yet un­
determined potentialities, or we might say the externalizing 
of internal movements. By communication we mean the trans­
ference of one or more of these expressions from one person 
to another.
The most striking proof of need for self-expression is 
the Essais themselves. They represent one of the most mon­
umental examples of this self-expression which the western 
world possesses. Strowski even maintains that Montaigne is 
the only person in the whole of civilization who actually
O Aexpressed himself in such a frank manner. There have been 
conjectures that Montaigne sought to express himself thus 
because he was unable to do so in deed. This is, however, 
not our concern. It suffices for us to remark that this 
work represents a great outpouring of the internal.
From our discussion of technique we can readily draw 
another demonstration of the necessity of self-expression.
We know that Montaigne found it necessary to ascertain just 
what he was. Apparently, the only way this could be done 
was by free self-expression. This then became a necessary
SOstrowski, 0£. cit., p. 335,
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prerequisite to self-knowledge, applicable not only to the 
author himself, but actually to all men as well. Since self- 
knowledge is, at least in the mind of Montaigne, man's pri­
mary endeavor, self-expression becomes an absolute necessity.
Montaigne's quest for sincerity is another indication 
of the value which he placed on self-expression. He expect­
ed all activities to stem directly from the essence of the 
individual, and placed falsehood as one of mankind's great­
est evils. He demands that one remain open and frank even 
though the consequences of such behavior may sometime be far 
from desirable.
This need for expression is not only demonstrated by 
implication, but is expressed quite overtly by the author of 
the Essais himself.
- —  "Et nous voyons que l'ame en ses passions se
pipe plustost elle mesme, se dressant un
faux subject et fantastique, voire contre sa
propre créance, que de n'agir contre quelque 
chose."31
Of this fact, Montaigne was able to speak from his own per­
sonal experience. He writes that he found himself losing 
his hold over his sanity when he did not in someway exercise 
his mind. It was as though someone had imprisoned him, and 
Michel de Montaigne could tolerate no kind of restriction 
whatsoever.
31"Comme l'ame descharge ses passions sur des objects 
faux, quand les vrais luy défaillent," p. 25.
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Still another proclamation of the need for self-expres­
sion is made in the Essay "Bur des vers de Virgile." 
Montaigne is concerned by the fact that evil enters into the 
self in such a manner that its coming is not detected and 
that once it has gained entrance, it blinds the self to its 
own evils. As a matter of fact, he says that the more sick
a soul is, the more nearly blind it is to its own illness.
It is necessary that it be extirpated, but the only way in 
which this can be done is by expressing it so that its exis­
tence in the âme can be brought into the light. By exter­
nalizing what is to be found interiorly, one is able to pass 
judgment on the results he finds. He can not simply look 
within himself and see the evil, for he is blinded to it by 
its very presence in him.
It is from this very expression that we are able to 
learn much about the self. By closely observing the subject 
in its functions, we soon become aware of its innate charac­
teristics, and indeed, the best fashion in which we can
grasp it is by expressing it in some way.
In "Des Menteurs" Montaigne makes the point that his 
lack of memory is perhaps one of the best things that could 
have happened to him. Why is this so? It is so because men 
have so entangled their selves with the workings of others 
that they are no longer able to speak directly, to act from 
their own existence, from their own essence; "sans exercer
32tisur des vers de Virgile," p. 823.
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leurs propres f o r c e s . Here can be found his great concern 
over education, lihat he has seen happen is the remaking of 
an individual into some kind of badly matched conglomeration 
inherited from the past. All learning must only serve to 
enhance and to develop that innate self, the âme.
It has become apparent that, in his discussion of the 
self, Montaigne is always dealing with a given entity, some­
thing already in existence. He never once refers to a 
tabula rasa and is constantly insisting that an individual 
can not be forced without harmful results. It is easily 
enough recalled that he tells his reader that he has never 
even tried to force his own self in its development but that 
he has let it unfold as it would. He even goes further 
along this same path, saying that in the very book in which 
he is expressing what he is, all that is to be found there 
has come directly from within and is in no way copied from 
outsiders. Any ideas which are in conformity with those of 
the ancients which he so freely quotes are completely after 
the fact: "depuis je les ai establies et fortifiées par
l'autorité d'autrui et par les sains discours des anciens, 
ausquels je me suis rencontré conforme en jugement.
The problem of the origin of this initial self and its 
ideas is never actually discussed in the Essais, at least 
not in a formal manner. The author simply maintains their
"Des menteurs," p. 35.
34"De la praesumption," pp. 641-642.
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presence, insists on the veracity of his statements and 
moves on in typical Montaigne fashion. We are forced to 
gather what we can from the general discussion and from cer­
tain opinions and implications which at times seem to be 
contradictory.
Keeping in mind that the author believes in a "mais­
tresse forme," that he believes all his ideas to have origi­
nated within himself and maintains that he has let himself 
unfold as was naturally intended without any active guidance, 
it appears strange that he would make the following state­
ment about human knowledge: "Les sens sont le commencement
et la fin de 1'humaine c o g n o i s s a n c e . What is more he does 
not even appear to accept the natural law whose dictates 
would, in some fashion, be common to and innate in all normal 
men. "Les loix de la conscience, que nous disons naistre 
de nature, naissent de la coustume."36
From where, then, proceed these ideas and opinions which 
he says originate within himself? What is the "maistresse 
forme" which he finds in every man? Why is it not right for 
an instructor to form his student as he would like him to 
be? If all is derived from environmental sources, there 
need be no concern for the actual status of the individual 
in question.
35"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 5 7 2 .
36"De la coustume et de ne changer aisément une loy 
receue," p. 1 1 4 .
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There appears to be an answer to these questions in 
Montaigne's belief in tendencies. Evidentally all people 
are born with tendencies which direct them toward a certain 
development. He apparently believed that people were born 
good and bad, or at least inclined to good or evil.3? 
Montaigne indicated just how strongly he felt on this issue 
when he wrote: "Les inclinations naturelles s'aident et
fortifient par institution; mais elles ne se changent guiere 
et surmontent."38 And again: "On n'extirpe pas ces
qualités originelles, on les couvre, on les cache."39
Montaigne discussed in great detail the treatment of the 
"ame bien née," but he says little of the "ame mal née."
That which he does write implies the use of force in the 
bringing up of the child, for he says that bad tendencies 
which manifest themselves early in childhood must be rooted 
out at a very early age. He does not sufficiently rule out 
force in these cases, but lets the matter slide by, encour­
aging the child's superiors to be ever vigilant in this early 
age lest vices take control of the mature person.
37Throughout the Essais Montaigne speaks of "ames 
bien nées." An example which is quite similar is to be 
found in "De l'institution des enfans," p. 165, where he 
speaks of "une nature bien née," and "De la phisionomie," 
p. 1,019 where he writes of "ames mal nées."
38"Du repentir," p. 788.
38"Du repentir," p. 788.
40«De la coustume et de ne changer aisément une loy 
receue," pp. 107-108.
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Perhaps it is with these natural inclinations and the 
attitudes and habits formed in early childhood that we are 
dealing. After all, Montaigne never really concerned himself 
with children, not even his own. Perhaps he considered as 
given and innate that which was present at the time the indi­
vidual became a reasonable creature. This would be the time 
when the tutor would have him in hand, when he would go off 
to school, when he would begin to function in society. How­
ever this may be, when Montaigne takes up the individual to 
be examined, he finds him already generally shaped and at 
the very beginning in danger of having his natural self 
engulfed in the tide of civilization. The individual is not 
only endangered on a large scale by major inroads, but in 
such small matters as taste and desires as well.
"Ces cupiditez estrangeres, que l'ignorance du 
bien et une fauce opinion ont coulées en nous, 
sont en si grand nombre qu'elles chassent 
presque toutes les naturelles; ny plus ny 
moins que si, en une cité, il y avoit si grand 
nombre d'estrangers qu'ils en missent hors les 
naturels habitans ou esteignissent leur 
authorité et puissance ancienne, l'usurpant 
entièrement et s'en saisissant."41
It is recognized that the problem of the innate self is 
not thoroughly explained by inclinations alone. It is dif­
ficult to accept them as the source of the ideas which 
Montaigne maintains took their origins from within himself. 
Somehow inclinations do not seem to have the necessary 
vitality for such operations. The question would be more
41"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 450.
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easily resolved if the author were referring to the making 
of judgments. It would not then be necessary that the ideas 
take their origins from within himself, but that only his 
reaction to them, his judgment of them arise from an already 
existing entity.
There exists another aspect to this question of ideas 
originating from within, it is that of inspiration and 
genius. Strictly speaking, inspiration by its very name 
implies external intervention, but not the normal interven­
tion. It takes its source from the divine. The author 
apparently had some belief in this, for when discussing the 
demon of Socrates he wrote:
"Chacun sent en soy quelque image de telles 
agitations d'une opinion prompte, vehemente et 
fortuite. C'est à moy de leur donner quelque 
authorité, qui en donne si peu à nostre pru­
dence. Et en ay eu de pareillement foibles en 
raison et violentes en persuasion ou en dis­
suasion, qui estoient plus ordinaires en 
Socrates, ausquelles je me laissay emporter si 
utilement^et heureusement qu'elles pourroyent 
estre jugées tenir quelque chose d'inspirationdivine.42
The author has taken another direction in his attempt 
to expose that vague entity which he felt to be stirring at 
the core of his being, at the heart of his individuality. 
This surpressed self seemed to be able to lift its head at 
times and to act of its own volition. Was this by means of 
divine assistance? Perhaps. The important thing is that 
it did function thus and that Montaigne was aware that it
42"Des prognostications," p. 45.
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did so function. Modern psychology, of course, has its own 
explanations of these events, but these explanations will not 
be examined here, for we wish to view them as Montaigne 
viewed them in the light of his own experiences. Somewhere, 
somehow, there existed a self disconnected from the outside 
world, endowed with its own powers and desires which appear­
ed to be internally generated.
Perhaps one of the most outstanding aspects of this 
"innate" self is that it is unique. It is individual. It is 
so by nature mainly because of those underlying native ten­
dencies which it possesses. This individuality gives every 
man the opportunity to shine forth at least in some small 
way, making every person valuable in his own right.
"II n'est point ame si chetifve et brutale en 
laquelle on. ne voye reluire quelque faculté 
particulière; il n'y en a point de si ensevelie 
qui ne face une saillie par quelque.bout."43
This individuality takes on a sacred character in 
Montaigne. It becomes the sole measurement of a man's activ­
ities. It becomes his sovereign guide: "Qui suit un autre,
il ne suit rien. Il ne trouve rien, voire il ne cherche 
r i e n . "44 There is nothing after which the individual is able 
confidently to pattern his life. He may look for reassur­
ance from the ranks of the ancients, but he must not seek 
them out as authorities for the conduct of his affairs.
43"De la praesumption," p. 635.
44"De l'institution des enfants," p. 150.
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Montaigne was one of the outstanding critics of those who 
accepted everything which could be based upon the authority 
of the ancients, yet he was one of the greatest admirers of 
those very ancients whose authority he questioned. Every 
man must reach his own conclusions and only then look to the 
ancients for support.
It must never be said, however, that Montaigne rejected 
authority. Indeed, he was one of its strongest supporters.
He upheld the authority of both church and state, but he 
upheld no authority over the intellect, over the individual's 
right to form himself according to his own individual lean­
ings.45 He lived by these beliefs, for he remained ever 
faithful to both his state and his church throughout his 
lifetime. This respect for authority was one of the reasons 
why he was against changing the form of the state or of the 
laws. He insisted that each be accepted by its own authori­
ty and gradually purified to bring about a more perfect 
society. This purification was to be a very gradual evolu­
tion toward justice. France of his day was a very clear 
example of what abrupt change led to.
Yet, this reverence for authority most certainly did not
carry over to the intellectual life of the individual:
"Qu'il luy face tout passer par I'estamine et 
ne loge rien en sa teste par simple authorité 
et à credit; les principes d'Aristote ne luy
45por the question of whether or not ecclestical 
authority interferes with the freedom of the intellect, we 
refer the reader to Strowski, o£. cit., pp. 182-183.
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soyent principes, non plus que ceux des 
Stoiciens ou Epicuriens. Qu'on luy propose 
cette diversité de jugemens: il choisira
s'il peut, sinon il en demeurera en doubte."
And on this subject Strowski writes: "Pour lui la sagesse
n'est point une science, elle n'a pas ses lois; chaque homme 
se fait la sienne selon ses 'conditions et humeurs
Very closely connected to this concept of the innate 
self is the problem of change. Can the self change so much 
from day to day that it will cease to be tomorrow what it is 
today? Montaigne asks himself this question and is, indeed, 
forced to say that there is as much difference between us 
and our selves as there is between us and other men. Yet, it 
becomes obvious that he is not speaking of an essential 
change, but rather of a change in point of view or even of 
magnitude. The Essay "Du repentir" gives very ample evidence 
of this lack of evolution in its tone alone. We have men­
tioned the instance in which he wrote that natural inclina­
tions never c h a n g e . 48 perhaps one of the most outstanding 
denials of change is the one he makes in that very seme chap­
ter when he writes that given the same set of environmental 
circumstances which elicited any previous act, he would 
always react in the same manner. This is a problem which he 
has with the idea of repentance, for he does everything with 
his whole being and can not conceive of ever doing it in any
4^"De l'institution des enfants," p. 150. 
^^Strowski, 0£. cit., p. 20.
4^Chapter II, p. 39.
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other fashion.49
Previous to this avowal that he would do everything over 
in the same manner, Montaigne relates that there has been a 
very definite continuity from youth to old age in his think­
ing.
"Je fay coustumierement entier ce que je fay et 
marche tout d'une piece; je n'ay guere de 
mouvement qui se cache et desrobe à ma raison, 
et qui ne se conduise à peu près par le con­
sentement de toutes mes parties, sans division, 
sans sedition■intestine ; mon jugement en a la 
coulpe ou la louange entiere; et la coulpe 
qu'il a une fois, il l'a tousjours, car quasi 
dès sa naissance il est un: mesme inclination,
mesme route, mesme force. Et en matière 
d'opinions universelles, dès l'enfance je me 
logeay au poinct ou j'avois à me tenir."50
Following this, Montaigne relates that his reason has 
not changed and that if he refrains from doing certain licen­
tious acts now, it is not that he would not if he but could. 
People, it would seem, mistake a lack of ability in old age 
for a change in the person h i m s e l f . 51
In the 1595 edition of the Essais the following state­
ment was added.
"Les choses, à part elles, ont peut estre leurs 
poids et mesures et conditions; mais au dedans, 
en nous, elle les leur taille comme elle 
1'entend.
La santé, la conscience, l'authoritê, la science, 
la richesse, la beauté et leurs contraires se 
despouillent à l'entrée et reçoive de l'ame
49"Du repentir," p. 791. 
50ibid., p. 790.
Sllbid., pp. 793-794.
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nouvelle vesture et de la teinture qu'il lui 
plaist."52
There exists in this a definite commitment to stability, but
in the same edition the following is added:
"Le mediter est un puissant estude et plein, 
à qui sçait se taster et employer vigoureuse­
ment : j'aime mieux forger mon ame que la
meubler."53
One finds himself presented with an apparent contradic­
tion. Can or can not the self be changed? If one is going 
to forge his self, certainly he is implying a change. The 
author believes that what Montaigne is speaking of here is 
actually some kind of personal development. It is most 
assuredly not a change from one essential position to an­
other. He is calling for a growth of what is already pres­
ent, a bringing into fruition of the seeds that are already 
to be found implanted in that reality which is termed "a 
human being."
Otherwise, one would find himself confronted with the 
same problem of submerging the real person under a great 
mass of tradition.
Montaigne makes it very plain that he does not read or 
study to acquire new facts. He further maintains that he 
hardly knows from whence his information comes. He relates 
that he has absorbed these facts, attitudes, and judgments, 
and has remade them into his own stuff. We know that he
52"De Democritus et Heraclitus," p. 290. 
53"De trois commerces," p. 797.
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abhorred the pedants of his day for their ostentatious re­
gurgitation of facts and saws which had been gleaned and 
accumulated, from their readings. They had not digested it 
or used it as matter for personal development, but had 
passed it on unprocessed like birds feeding their y o u n g . ^ 4  
The meubles to which the author makes reference in the pre­
vious quotation are all the facts and opinions which these 
savants were passing on.
Another statement of Montaigne which lends support to
the idea of an entity in the process of growth is quoted in
the following excerpt:
"Nous prenons en garde les opinions et le 
sçavoir d'autruy et puis c'est tout. Il les 
faut faire nostres. Nous semblons propre­
ment celuy qui, ayant besoign de feu, en 
iroit quérir chez son voisin, et, y en ayant 
trouvé un beau et grand, s'arresteroit là à 
se chauffer, sans plus se souvenir d'en 
reporter chez soy. Que nous sert-il d'avoir 
la panse pleine de viande, si elle ne se 
digere? Si elle ne se trans-forme en nous?
Si elle ne nohs augmente et fortifie?"55
It is to be remarked that there is a previously exist­
ing self which is ever transforming its surroundings into 
itself rather than adapting itself to its environment. It 
is not a situation where the self is constantly converting 
itself into conformity. Montaigne reinforced this concept 
in the 1595 edition with the following addition to the exist­
ing text :
^4"Du pedantisme," p. 135. 
S^lbid., p. 136.
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"Il en devoit rapporter l'ame pleine, il ne 
l'en rapporte que bouffie; et l'a seulement 
enflée au lieu de la g r o s s i r . "56
The thing to take notice of in this quotation is the 
fact that the author chose to use the word "grossir" instead 
of something like "changer."
We may say, therefore that the self does and does not 
change. It changes in size and capability, but not in es­
sence. That which was before reaches to new heights.
It would appear that the self is capable of being 
forced into a non-natural direction. It may even take on 
the characteristics of something else, but this is only a 
superficial change which is always in conflict with the nat­
ural and the innate. It brings on a lack of sincerity in a 
person and causes him to project himself in a manner which 
belies what he truly is, not only to others but to himself 
as well. Indeed, the problem created is even worse than 
that. If the individual is forced to go against his natural 
inclinations, he will seek to do violence; violence first of
all to others, and if this is not possible, violence to him-
57self. This forcing is not easily done, for the individual 
will naturally revolt against such an endeavor. Indeed, 
Montaigne accepts the fact that an individual may be forced, 
but he does not believe that the person will develop along 
the lines intended, but will turn to some other way, only
S G l b i d . , p .  1 3 7 .
"Comme l'ame descharge ses passions," p. 25.
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pretending to accept what is being pressed upon him. The 
fact of the matter is that the act of forcing causes some­
thing quite contrary to what is desired:
"Je n'ay veu autre effect aux verges sinon de 
rendre les ames plus laches ou plus malitieuse-
ment opiniastres."^8
"Il y a je ne sçay quoy de servile en la 
rigueur et en la contraincte; et tiens que 
ce qui ne se peut faire par la raison, et 
par prudence et adresse, ne se faict jamais
par la f o r c e . " 5 9
It is to this lack of force in his educators that 
Montaigne ascribes the success of his education. In his col­
lege training he recognizes very little success due to the 
method then in use in the French schools, force and more 
force.
Force may be applied by occupations as well as by indi­
viduals, by philosophies as well as philosophers. For this 
reason he makes it plain that one must be very careful in 
choosing what he will absorb. One must refrain from all 
that does not directly pertain to his self, which is not of 
his self.GO He may use the remainder for trimming, but he 
must not incorporate it for it will change his direction and 
probably inflict harm upon his self.
Now, this self can be and is sometimes so suddenly 
shaken that it loses its sense of direction, but these
GO"De l'affection des peres aux enfans," p. 359. 
G^Ibid., p..368.
GO"De mesnager sa volonté," p. 986.
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events, such as an extremely displeasing act,61 or serious 
violence to the body,62 or even divine intervention,63 are 
beyond its control and simply must be accepted for its own 
well being.
Montaigne points out that a self which has itself in 
control and which is moving in its proper direction will not 
be fluctuating from opinion to opinion; another reason for 
his respect for stability.64 it is only the weak and under­
developed who fluctuate from one stand to another. Of course 
he is not excluding doubt, for doubt was almost always with 
Montaigne. Doubt, however, is not reason enough for change.
Montaigne admits that impressions may be made on the 
âme, but as is evidenced by what has just been stated, the 
presence of many impressions is undesirable, and the only 
good ones are those which push the self further along in the 
direction of its natural development. This aspect of his 
philosophy may indeed have caused Montaigne no little un­
happiness, at least in his earlier years; for as Dowden 
maintains; "all the reasons for and against any course of 
conduct were present to his mind; it cost him infinite pain 
to decide and constrain himself to the voluntary servitude
^^"De la tristesse," p. 15.
62«De I'exercitation," p. 357.
63"De la constance," pp. 47-48.
64«C'est folie de rapporter le vray et le faux à 
nostre suffisance," p. 177.
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of his own will."^^ It is a very difficult task to choose
for one's self-consumption only that which is of its own
kind. This is the only road to wisdom, for it hinges on self-
knowledge and acting in accordance with this knowledge.
"Quand bien nous pourrions estre sçavans du 
sçavoir d'autruy, au moins sages ne pouvons 
nous estre que de nostre propre sagesse.
Thus it is that the change with which Montaigne was con­
cerned was what can be termed "growth." As Montaigne saw it, 
an essential quality of the self is that it is not stagnant, 
it is ever in the process of amplification, of growth. This 
kind of progress is essential to his undertaking. It repre­
sents his method of presentation. In "Du repentir" he wrote: 
"Je ne peints pas 1'estre. Je peints le passage."G? As was 
mentioned in the first chapter, there was no other way in 
which he could explain or describe his self because he could 
not exactly lay hands on it. By showing it in action, he 
could come closer to giving a true description, for this 
type of portrait gives what most portraits are unable to 
give, a presentation of process, a state of motion, a sense 
of change and evolution.
"Si mon^ame.pouvait prendre pied, je ne 
m'essaierais pas, je me résoudrais; elle
^^Edward Dowden, Michel de Montaigne (Philadelphia: 
J. B. Lippincott Company, 1905), p. 251.
66"Du pedantisme," p. 137.
^^"Du repentir," p. 782.
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est toujours en apprentissage et en 
espreuve."^8
He might just as well have added: "Elle est vivante, elle
existe."
The way in which the self grows is by attaining a fuller
concept of what it is, by a more complete comprehension of
its capabilities and of its faults. This growth brings with
it a firm grasp upon the direction the self must take and
also manifests itself in a kind of tranquility, a freedom
from fear and insecurity. This in turn represents the final
end to which Montaigne was striving.
"Et cette tâche qui domine toute l'histoire 
de Montaigne, c'est l'acquisition de la tran-
quilité de l'âme: c'est la conquête de la
sagesse."
This tranquility which established itself in Montaigne 
was due in the main to the fact that he chose to record his 
progress in development. This work served to keep him on 
the right track once it was established; it acted as a guide 
for all his future actions. He was saved from any confusion 
and forgetfulness which might have occurred had he simply 
made mental observations. The Essais provided him with the 
opportunity to view the self as an outsider and thus to ob­
serve certain characteristics which he would not have other­
wise noticed. This in turn permitted him to develop himself
in a more detailed manner as well as more extensively. It
^^Ibid.
^^Strowski, 0£. cit., p. 18.
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was for this reason that he was able to write: "Je n'ay pas
plus faict mon livre que mon livre m'a faict.
Evidentally this growth does finally come to a close with
old age, at least Montaigne felt this to be so for he wrote:
"Je ne suis plus en termes d'un grand change­
ment, et de me jetter à un nouveau trein et 
inusité. Non pas mesme vers 1'augmentation.
Il n'est plus temps de devenir autre."'!
Potentiality must now be realized, motion must now become 
substance. This is the end of the "passage" and the begin­
ning of the "estre."
"Somme, me voicy après à achever cet homme, non 
à en refaire un autre. Par long usage cette 
forme m'est passée en substance, et fortune 
en nature."7%
Perhaps this was one of the reasons for Montaigne's
great disdain for old age. When this lack of motion had set
in, when the self had ceased to develop, life became after
the fact. The self must be a moving, growing entity.
^^"Du démentir," p. 648.
^!"De mesnager sa volonté," p. 987. 
72lbid., p. 988.
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CHAPTER III 
THE ÂME IN ITS FUNCTIONS 
There is another way that a clearer view of the self 
may be obtained, and that is by observing the âme through 
the medium of its functions. Montaigne lets fall little 
insights into what kind of activities one might find this 
âme engaged in, those which are distinctly separate from 
those of the body. These activities are of particular inter­
est because they reflect the movements of that element which 
lies at the core of the self.
It will not be our intention to maintain that the activ­
ity of the âme is completely separated from the action of the 
corps, but one may certainly single out various activities as 
being primarily of the âme, or primarily of the corps. There 
are times, however, when Montaigne makes it quite clear that 
the activity he is describing is almost entirely an activity 
of the âme, or entirely an activity of the corps. One can
readily see that in the latter case a typical instance of a
purely physical act would be one which is automatic. This 
is quite evident and needs no real elaboration. In the case 
of the former, dreams have already been mentioned. These 
Montaigne believed to be, if not completely, then almost com­
pletely, expressions of the âme.
54
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This division of functions is not always easily or ob­
viously made, for Montaigne relates that even speech carried 
on while under severe shock is an expression of the corps.1 
Memory and judgment would seem to be the key to discernment 
in this matter. If one has expressed judgment and can per­
haps remember it, then the chances are that the activity in 
question was performed by the âme. Most certainly, if no 
judgment was required, the particular activity may be clas­
sified along with those of the corps.
Love as Montaigne understood it could not be classified
among the activities of the âme. The body was the all im­
portant actor in this undertaking. By love here, we are 
referring to love between man and woman. Platonic love was 
not understood, nor was it practiced by him. He does not 
even see sexual love, or even emotional love as a very desir­
able element in marriage. Quite the contrary:
"Ung bon mariage, s'il en est, refuse la com- 
paignie et conditions de l'amour. Il tache 
à représenter celles de l'amitié. C'est une 
douce société de vie, pleine de constance, de 
fiance et d'un nombre infiny d'utiles et 
solides offices et obligations mutuelles.
Aucune femme qui en savoure le gouste ne vou- 
droit tenir lieu de maistresse et amye à son 
mary."^
Montaigne maintained that experience had taught him 
that love was mostly a physical thing. He had observed the 
fact that the ladies always fell in love with men who were
^"De I'exercitation," p. 356.
^"Sur des vers de Virgile," p. 829.
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handsome and built well rather than with those who were ugly
or old, but intelligent.3 The author very bluntly admits
that he is no different from the ladies in this matter and
was in perfect agreement with them.
"Au demeurant, je faisois grand conte de 
l'esçrit, mais pourveu que le corps n'en fut 
pas a dire; car, à respondre en conscience, 
si l'une ou l'autre des deux beautez devoit 
nécessairement y faillir, j'eusse choisi de 
quitter plutost la spirituelle; elle a son 
usage en meilleures choses; mais, au subject 
de l'amour, subject qui principallement se 
rapporte à la veue et à 1'atouchement, on 
faict quelque chose sans les graces de 
l'esprit, rien sans lés graces corporelles."4
Finally, in "Sur des vers de Virgile," he explains him­
self in very simple terms :
"Or done, laissant les livres à part, parlant 
plus matériellement et simplement, je trouve 
après tout que l'amour n'est autre chose que 
la soif de cette jouyssance en un subject 
désiré, ny Venus autre chose que le plaisir 
à descharger ses vases, qui devient vicieux 
ou par immoderation, ou indiscrétion."^
The âme is not, however, completely divorced from love, 
for Montaigne demands consent and affection in the person 
that he loves. If the will is not involved he has no desire
for the body.^ He suggests that the âme even go further,
that it aid the body in its endeavor to enjoy its pleasures,
that it help to cultivate the body's ability in love making.
^"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 471. 
^"De trois commerces," pp. 804-805.
^"Sur des vers de Virgile," p. 855. 
^Ibid., pp. 860-861.
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and finally that it, too, seek to find some pleasure in love, 
if possible.7
It becomes clear that Montaigne's greater appreciation 
for a book than for a child stems at least in part from this 
attitude which he had toward heterosexual relations. His 
child was simply a result of certain physical or social ne­
cessities. His book took its origin within the âme. It was 
an expression of his self while his child was the expression 
of a biological accident.
In "Du pedantisme," Montaigne reveals, partially at 
least, his dislike for rhetoric and speech and his interest 
in government.̂  Here he proclaims rhetoric and speech to be 
exercises of the body, while governing, legislating, and 
commanding are activities of the âme. The last three, in his 
mind, require that one exercise his jugement while the former 
two require only a physical skill, much like the game of 
tennis or equestrian skills.
A very large part of the Essais deal with some aspect 
of these three expressions of the âme. Perhaps Montaigne's 
inability to spend his life actively projecting his self in 
these areas led him to do so in a literary fashion. Here in 
his Essais he was able to command all armies from ancient 
times to the present. Here he was able to review all the 
laws known to man and to pass judgment on them. Here he was
^Ibid., p. 871.
Du pedantisme," pp. 132-143.
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able to review all the laws known to man and to pass judgment 
on them. Here he was able to lead great kingdoms and to seek 
out the flaws which toppled the great empires prior to his 
time. He could protect the weak and lower the mighty, and 
could determine how he would have acted under any circum­
stances and call to mind all the pros and cons that any one 
actually functioning in such circumstances must have had to 
consider before acting. It was known how Alexander conducted 
himself. How would Montaigne have acted?
It follows from this that the âme has a creative function. 
In the "Apologie" he refers to these mental or creative en­
deavors as "inventions" of the âme whose correctness did not 
really matter as long as they could be defended in the face 
of contrary arguments.^ This point of view is not at all 
startling in view of his attitude toward knowledge. This was 
all that could be demanded of any theory or mental action, 
that it be defensible. There was practically nothing whose 
contrary could not be upheld by an astute mind.
In its creative function, the âme acts like the body in 
giving birth. It must be fertile, it must be sown, and it 
must labor to bring forth its creation. The great product 
of this function is jugement. This creation brings into play 
all that the âme is and all of the factual knowledge that it 
has acquired. The proper use of this function represents the 
crowning achievement of the individual. Somehow it does not
^"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 492.
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depend on knowledge, but is a skill which can even exist 
apart from truth, or at least from objective truth, for it 
is a truth in i t s e l f . it is perhaps the highest truth at­
tainable by man, even though it is a relative, individual
truth. It was to the achievement of this skill that
Montaigne set his sights. As Strowski puts it:
"La faculté particulière à l'homme, celle qui 
le caractérisé et le classe, c'est pour
Raymond Sebond la faculté de juger et de vou­
loir: et cette leçon encore ne sera pas perdue
pour^Montaigne; désormais il consacrera sa vie,
non à devenir plus docte, mais à s'exercer à 
juger et à juger librement, directement.
The above fact presents another reason for Montaigne's 
distaste for the acquiring of facts and for becoming too in­
volved in the pursuit of any academic endeavor. These 
tended to cloud over and to replace that primary concern, 
the development of jugement. He proclaims very loudly that 
he never studies:
"Je feuillette les livres, je ne les estudie 
pas: ce qui m'en demeure, c'est chose que je ne
reconnois plus estre d'autruy; c'est cela 
seulement de quoy mon jugement a faict son 
profict, les discours et les imaginations dequoy
il s'est imbu; l'autheur, le lieu, les mots et
autres circonstances, je les oublie inconti­
nent. "12
He even expresses some fear of great learning and over en­
thusiasm which could drive an individual to a state of being
10"Des livres," p. 388. 
llstrowski, o£. cit., p. 81.
12"De la praesumption," p. 635.
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completely out of contact with his surroundings and hence in­
capable of exercising his " j u g e m e n t . This is not to say 
that Montaigne did not admire those who were able to excell 
in academic pursuits; indeed, he expressed great admiration 
for Adrien Turnêbe. It is even obvious from the content of 
the Essais that, contrary to what he might have written, he 
did do a great deal of research and academic study himself. 
Perhaps the great difference between Montaigne and the typi­
cal Renaissance scholar was the fact that Montaigne sought 
to achieve knowledge for development of his jugement and not 
because of an avid interest in the matter itself.
Apart from but closely allied to the creative act of 
judging is the assimilating of knowledge. It is the âme 
which receives what is brought in and remolds it into what it 
wishes. It is because of this fact that it must be trained 
to make an automatic acceptance of rejection of anything en­
tering, based on the direction it must take. It must be so 
known to itself that any foreign matter may find it impossi­
ble even to gain entrance. Apart from every day experiences, 
Montaigne found two main ways for obtaining this knowledge. 
One could acquire it by travel or one could acquire it from 
reading. His own life gave witness to the fact that he pre­
ferred travel. He. was himself aware of this preference for 
he writes in "De la vanité" that he knows of no better school 
for forming life than to be presented with the diversity of
^^"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 472.
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lives which one encounters while traveling. What makes it 
an even more appealing method is the fact that the body is not 
left idle.14 with books, the situation is quite the contrary. 
In "De trois commerces," he writes that books present know­
ledge in a somewhat painful way and not to just any indivi­
dual. Besides, books leave the body inactive and cause it
to weaken.15
As might well be expected, Montaigne ascribes the thought 
process to the âme almost entirely. This is, again, not to 
say that he is unaware of the importance of the role that 
the body plays, for he makes the observation that after his 
fall from a horse, the functions of the âme returned simul­
taneously with the functions of the body. He is not equa­
ting the two here, but observing their cofunctioning. It is 
however, a prime function of the âme to receive the sensual 
impressions transmitted to it by the body and, as he says:
"à desvestir et despouiller leurs conditions 
corruptibles, et leur faire laisser à part 
comme vestements superflus et viles, 
l'espesseur, la longueur, la profondeur, le 
poids, la couleur, 1'odeur, l'aspreté, la 
pollisseure, la dureté, la mollesse et tous 
accidens sensibles, pour les accommoder à 
sa condition immortelle et spirituelle."1°
Even so, jugement ranks above this function, for this 
is not the function which sets men apart from the other
^4"De la vanité," p. 951.
^5"De trois commerces," p. 807.
"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," pp. 460-461.
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animals. Animals, as well as men, are able to form con­
cepts.1? Only men form judgments.
Creativity, production, was, for Montaigne, a function 
which was of the highest importance to his actual existence. 
But part and parcel of this creativity was communication.
It was not enough that an individual be able to bring to 
light his essence, but he must have other individuals who 
could accept this expression and in some way reflect back to 
him not only his own projected image, but their own recon­
struction of that projection.
Francis Jeanson maintains that the great loss which was
felt at the death of Etienne de la Boetie was based on this
need for another to cause the self to exist. He writes:
"En fait, il a perdu son être et ne conserve 
plus que son existence qui a précisément cessé 
d'être en cessant d'être c o n n u e . "18
The question arises; why would one lose his being if he 
ceased to be known? Jeanson maintains that Montaigne's free­
dom was confounded with his existence, but that since he 
could never lay hands on it himself, he was forced to do so 
through an intermediary.19 It was only by way of an inter­
mediary that he could obtain his freedom.
This theory is actually not limited to Jeanson's thinking
l^Ibid., p. 461.
l^Michel de Montaigne, Montaigne par lui même, 
(Paris; Editions du Seuil, 1960) , p. 55.
l^lbid., p. 60.
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on Montaigne, for the philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr makes
generally the same statement about every self.
"It (the self) is not merely dependent upon 
others for its sustenance and security. It 
is dependent upon them for the image which it 
has of itself and for the spiritual security 
which is as necessary to the self as its
social security."20
It is almost as though the self were blind to its own 
operations. Only another self can visualize and project 
what has been expressed by the self which is seeking its 
identity. Perhaps this is something of what Montaigne had 
in mind when he wrote: "Nul plaisir n'a goust pour moi sans
communication."21 Perhaps this is also the reason that he 
cries out so loudly for a friend in the Essais. Very prob­
ably, this is also the reason for his very close friendship 
with Mile de Gournay, his "fille d'alliance."
From what can be gathered about her. Mile de Gournay 
could not be ranked among the intellectuals of her day. 
Indeed, she may even have been somewhat less than intelli­
gent; yet she captivated Montaigne, probably simply because 
she made a great show of appreciating his work. She sought
him out to tell him so. He was convinced that here was a
person, albeit a woman, whose capabilities for friendship he 
had placed in a questionable light in his Essay "De
l'amitié," a person with whom he was able to set up some kind
20Reinhold Neibuhr, The Self and the Dramas of 
History, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 4-5,
21»De la vanité," p. 965.
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of communication ̂ perhaps the first since Etienne de la 
Boetie. It appears that Montaigne's high esteem for and 
praises of this woman were representative of some growing 
desire he had for approval, despite what he might have writ­
ten about flattery. From the vantage point of today, one can 
see that none of his predictions about her literary future 
ever came true. It is difficult to understand what he appre­
ciated in her. The only answer appears to be that his desire 
to communicate became so overwhelming in his old age that he 
was unable to use good judgment. He was ready to accept 
anyone who would seek him out. A show of respect v/as enough 
to win over this very lonely old man.
This fact should not actually surprise one who has 
caught the cries of loneliness and even desperation in the 
Essais. As Jeanson has pointed out he was in great need of 
capturing himself again in an intermediary. He became des­
perate for acceptance. The Essais themselves prove this;
"Montaigne est un gentilhomme qui souffre de 
ne point apparaître d'emblée comme tel; il 
est une conscience 'curieuse' de soi, et qui 
souffre de n'être jamais assez connue. Dans 
les deux cas, il s'efforce d'y remédier: il
monte à cheval et il publie les Essais."22
We feel that Montaigne was striving for a second kind 
of communication, a communication with his own self. As 
Moreau points out, there are always essentially two selves, 
a present self and a historical self. Any time that one
22Montaigne, Montaigne par lui même, p. 59.
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expresses his actions he is speaking of his historical self. 
Any time that he expresses his thoughts, he is expressing 
his present self.^^ Now it may be added that upon reading 
what one has written, even if he is reading his thoughts, he 
is observing his historical self. It is an impossibility for 
one to observe his present self. If Montaigne needed another 
person, another self to create his living existence for him, 
to reflect what he projected, it is obvious that this reflec­
tion of necessity will always be a reflection of the histor­
ical self. Any friend's concept of his friend will of ne­
cessity be based on the historical self. In effect it 
appears to us that the Essais served the same purpose in this 
endeavor that an individual would have served. They were 
able to reflect the historical self to the present self.
Thus he achieved a continuity not in the mind of a second 
party, but in his own mind. Mile de Gournay was able to pro­
vide one thing which he could not adequately supply himself, 
affection.
Montaigne relates that friendship is kept alive by com­
munication; indeed, it may be said to be communication itself 
in its purest form.Perfect friendship results when two 
selves are able to reflect one another perfectly and when 
finally they are able to combine their identities and their
23pierre Moreau, Montaigne, 1'homme et 1'oeuvre, 
(Paris, Boivin, 1939), pp. 43-44.
24"De l'amitié," p. 184.
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w i l l s . 25 This kind of communication knows no bounds and 
grows in desirability the more it is d e v e l o p e d . 2® This kind 
of communication also excludes any similar kind of communi­
cation with another individual. Everything is held in common 
and nothing can be shared.
In his discussion of true friendship, true communication, 
Montaigne reveals that, in his opinion, friendship is the 
truest expression of man's free will: "Et nostre liberté
volontaire n'a point de production qui soit plus proprement 
sienne que celle de l'affection et amitié."2? This is found 
in the same paragraph in which he writes of a loss of free 
will due to this close communication.
This "liberté volontaire" is not easily granted to any
individual by Montaigne. He quite obviously did not believe
that it was possessed by most men in most circumstances. In
the 1595 edition of the Essais the following was added to
"De la force de l'imagination":
"Mais nostre volonté, pour les droits de 
qui nous mettons en avant ce reproche, com­
bien plus vraysemblablement la pouvons- 
nous marquer de rebellion et sedition par 
son desreglement et désobéissance! Veut- 
elle toujours ce que nous voudrions qu'elle 
voulsist? Ne veut-elle pas souvent ce 
que nous luy prohibons de vouloir; et à 
nostre evident dommage? Se laisse-elle
2^Ibid., p. 188. 
26ibid., p. 187. 
2?Ibid., p. 190.
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non plus mener aux conclusions de nostreraison?"28
Strowski and Jeanson give primary importance to this 
acquisition of freedom in Montaigne's Essais. Jeanson was 
quoted as linking Montaigne's being and liberty together, 
and Strowski shows his works as the reflection of a constant 
struggle for freedom. He discusses this problem of the ac­
quisition of freedom rather adroitly, and brings to light 
an interesting and not-so-apparent difficulty which Montaigne 
had to overcome in his efforts to achieve a free will. He 
maintains that after one has freed himself from all environ­
mental pressures, he exercises his free will, and forms 
ideas and makes decisions which, as soon as they have become 
facts, tend to immobilize themselves and to enslave the 
agent. He (Strowski) maintains that Montaigne was success­
ful in escaping from this difficulty as well as from all the 
other difficulties.
Aside from this negative approach to freedom of the 
will, Strowski ascribes certain positive attributes to 
Montaigne which enabled him to carry this successful venture 
of his. These are as follows;
a) a vigorous will:
"L'esclave n'a pas besoin d'avoir une per­
sonality forte; chateau branlant, il est 
soutenu par 1'échafaudage extérieur des règles 
imposées. Mais le sage, qui n 'est pas étayé 
du dehors, a besoin d'avoir en lui la force 
qui le fait tenir droit."
^^"De la force de l'imagination," p. 101.
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b) a religious âme:
"L'esclave, pour l'action et la pensée, se con­
tente d'idées claires et de préceptes absolus: 
la morale qui lui convient est celle qui 
s'exprime comme un code, et la certitude qu'il 
embrasse est celle qui a les caractères de la 
vérité scientifique. Cette précision et cette 
clarté le dispensent de rien mettre de lui- 
même soit dans sa foi s'il est croyant, soit 
dans son incrédulité s'il est incroyant; et 
l'incrédulité plus précise lui convient mieux 
que la foi plus mystique. L'homme libre, 
ayant besoin de certains éléments généraux pour 
la vie intellectuelle et la vie morale, les 
demande à une religion et non à la science; 
mais dé cette religion les dogmes auront une 
signification symbolique, une infinie étendue, 
et une inépuisable fécondité, en sorte que, 
d'heure en heure, d'instant en instant, l'âme 
du croyant, après y être entrée, y pourra 
changer, vivre, se développer selon sa spon­
tanéité intérieure.
c) a lively spirit detached from its contents:
"Car 1'esclave a le fétichisme de la formule 
ou de l'idée sans laquelle il ne pourrait 
balbutier un mot; il veut imposer ce dieu à 
tout le monde; fanatique et tyran, il est,
si son dieu appartient au passé, un misonéiste 
stupide, et si son dieu n'a pas achevé de se 
révéler, un révolutionnaire féroce. Le sage 
est ironique, au moins légèrement, vis-à-vis 
de lui-même; et par un heureux mélange de 
dilettantisme et de scepticisme, qui n'altère 
pas la solidité des convictions il est homme 
et non point machine.
d) a warm and human heart:
"L'homme libre, qui vit en pleine et solide 
réalité, et qui sait bien que cette réalité 
complexe des choses est la condition même de 
l'exercise réel de sa liberté, respecte in­
finiment ce qui est, et dans ce,qui est, ce 
qui sera; il ne fait violence à aucune 
spontanéité.
If one adds to the evidence presented by these two 
scholars the fact that the technique which Montaigne used in
29Strowski, o£. cit., pp 342-345,
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writing the Essais was based on a quest for freedom, the ex­
ercise of free will then demonstrates itself to be of primary 
importance to the self. This and jugement are intimately 
tied together; it might even be said of them that they are 
inseparable. But it is no easy matter to acquire the proper 
functioning of these two elements. It is the work of a life 
time and represents a struggle against what would appear to 
be almost impossible odds.
It would appear that, in Montaigne's philosophy, the 
self, in the beginning, has only one basic freedom of the 
will, and that is the will to be free. From this point it 
must work at choosing, at freeing, until finally it can 
truthfully say, "I choose to do thus and so." But until one 
knows himself, he can never be certain whether he is acting 
from pure internal freedom or from some environmental pres­
sure outside the self. It is for this reason that he 
(Montaigne) was able to speak of the will as he did in the 
quotation from "De la force de l'imagination" (see page 66). 
He could, under these circumstances write of "nostre volonté" 
as an element outside the self, an element which can only 
coincide with a self that has been made so free that it is 
pure "volonté," pure expression of the truth which lies 
hidden within. Until such a state has been reached, one's 
very will may act against what one wills, for it is not 
actually his will but the will of his environment which he is 
unable to force into obedience. The self is prisoner to its 
own faculties. It is as though some extraneous self had
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possessed the individual and by some means had so seized and 
duped him that he acts the part of a puppet, all the while 
believing that it is he himself who is pulling the strings.
As has been previously stated, choice could never be
simple for Montaigne. He was too thoroughly committed to the
exercise of free will for him to act in an easy manner. It
was always a matter of total involvement.
"Le deliberer voire es choses plus legieres,^ 
ra'importune ; et sens mon esprit plus empesche 
à souffrir le branle et les secousses 
diverses du doute et de la consultation, qu'à 
se rassoir et résoudre à quelque çarty que ce 
soit après que la chance est l i v r é e . "30
He was unable to act as most men did, pushed by one cir­
cumstance or another. He had to call everything into play 
not only for monumental decisions but for everyday menial 
tasks. There was in reality no difference in the two for him. 
It would have been as easy for him to rule the world as to 
rule Montaigne, or Paris, or France. He was very thankful 
when fortune left him no choice.
Because a complete discussion of this subject is beyond 
the scope of this study, we will leave it at this point, re­
ferring the reader to the excellent works of Jeanson and 
Strowski for any further information.
In the Essais, all human emotions and what might be 
termed "passions" are generally considered to take their 
origin in the âme. This kind of division is actually made
30"De la praesumption," p. 627.
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by the author himself and can be especially noted in the
Essay "L'histoire de Spurina." The following is an example
of the kind of discussion that is found in this essay and
of the rather obvious and overt division which Montaigne
makes in the "passions" of the âme and of the body:
"La ou les passions qui sont toutes en l'ame, 
comme l'ambition, l'avarice et autres, don­
nent bien plus à faire à la raison; car elle
n'y peut estre secourue que de ses propres
moyens, ny ne sont ces appetits-là capables 
de satiété, voire ils s'esguisent et aug­
mentent par la jouyssance."31
The obvious exception to this fact is, of course, love. 
Yet, as has been pointed out, this emotion is not entirely 
divorced from the âme, for it exercises its powers on this 
element as well as on the body.
It is not a difficult task to judge whether or not a 
particular emotion is of the âme or of the body; that is, 
according to Montaigne, for he has related that there exists 
a rather simple testing rule that can be applied. Stating 
this rule simply, it is that any passion or emotion that can 
be controlled by reason or philosophy takes its origin in 
the âme. Thus it is that love must take its origin in the
body, for it is extremely difficult to control by any means,
including reason and philosophy. When the answer might be 
in doubt when this rule has been applied, there exists a 
second rule or test which can be applied. This test is based 
on the question of satiety. One simply expresses the
^^"L'histoire de Spurina," p. 705.
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particular emotion or "passion" allowing it to develop in the 
direction of its natural leaning. If it reaches a state of 
fulfillment, if it can be appeased, it is of the body. If 
expression and development only lead to a greater craving for 
expression and further development, then the "passion" is of 
the âme. Love, by this measurement as well, is of the 
body, for when it is expressed and exercised, it is satisfied, 
it reaches fulfillment.
Aside from the question of love, Montaigne avoids the 
other passions of the body, perhaps because he felt them to 
be rather rudimentary and self evident. Such feelings as 
hunger and thirst were of no real interest in the search for 
the self. Man could more or less instinctively understand 
and fulfill these needs without any deep searching. Somehow, 
from the very fact that it is debated, the feeling of love 
presented a problem to Montaigne. He was not so certain of 
it as he was of the other feelings. It was not as generally 
evident.
For a person who claimed to be entirely physical, the 
author demonstrated a lack of understanding of this particu­
lar element in the self's make-up, even on a physical level.
He was never one to give himself over to it completely and 
was at times completely unable to experience it, even when it 
should have been instinctive on a physical level, when he 
could find no good reason for it. It is generally considered
32"Ibid.," pp. 705-706.
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a most natural and instinctive love that a parent feels for
his offspring, yet Montaigne could not claim such a feeling,
because it did not make sense to him; it was not rational,
and would not fit properly into his system of logic.
"Comme, sur ce subject de quoy je parle, je 
ne puis recevoir cette passion dequoy on 
embrasse les enfans à peine encore nez, 
n'ayant ny mouvement en l'ame, ny forme 
reconnoissable au corps, par où ils se puis­
sent rendre a i m a b l e s . "33
Does a purely physical act require a reason for its ex­
pression, especially when that act is generally an instinc­
tive one? The fact that an unquestioning expression of love 
was absent in Montaigne would seem to indicate that it was 
in some way connected with the âme, for he has placed reason 
definitely within the domaine of the spiritual. By his own 
thinking this would make it a function of the âme.
Montaigne's thinking on this issue may have been a 
little clouded by the tragedies he faced so often within his 
own family. Since all but one of his children died in 
infancy, it may well be that he used this kind of thinking as 
a defense against almost certain grief. The pain was not so 
great if one did not really love the infants which he v?as 
constantly losing.
In this discussion no attempt is made to distinguish 
among "passions," emotions, vices and virtues because 
Montaigne himself did not see fit to do so himself in the
33"De I'affection des peres aux enfants," p. 366.
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Essais. He groups them in the same general category, "pas­
sions," and treats them in more or less the same manner. This 
fact is not really surprising, for he was never interested in 
these aspects as individual concepts or categories, but only 
as reflections of the state of that which engendered them.
An emotion was spawned by the same entity which entertained 
a vice or a virtue. Besides, vices and virtues were in a 
manner of speaking, simply a repetition of a good or a bad 
emotion. They merely represented different reflections of 
the same entity. The most germaine problem to this study at 
this point is, as in the case of love, the determining of 
whether or not these aspects are purely physical, and hence 
beyond control; whether they are spiritual and controllable; 
whether they are reflections of both the âme and the body 
and are thus only partially controllable.
Generally speaking, it is with the spiritual that he 
deals, for reasons previously stated; but in many instances 
there is no way of telling. The only clues are those which 
can be drawn from the general discussion and from the appli­
cation of his own guidelines. There are certain times when 
he makes a definite classification: there are others which
are almost definite due to the tone of the statement. Some 
examples of these are given here:
Ambition et avarice: "La ou les passions qui
sont toutes en l'ame comme 1'ambition, l'avarice 
et autres, donnent bien à faire à la r a i s o n . "34
34"L'histoire de Spurina," p. 706.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 5
Jalousie et envie ; "Cette nostre exaspera- 
tion immodérée et illégitime contre ce vice 
naist de la plus vaine et tempestueuse 
maladie qui afflige les ames humaines, qui 
est la jalousie. Celle-là et l'envie, sa . 
soeur, me semblent des plus ineptes de la 
troupe."35
Pitié: "Car quelle pitié toucha jamais des
ames qui, pour la doubteuse information de 
quelque vase d'or à piller, fissent griller 
devant leurs yeux un homme."36
Peur: "Qui auroit fait perdre pied à mon
ame (because of fear) ne la remettreit 
jamais droict en sa place."3'
La gloire et curiosité: "La gloire et
la curiosité sont les deux fléaux de nostre 
âme.
Colere: "Il n'est passion qui esbranle
tant la sincérité des jugemens que la colere."39
In the above quotation, the conclusion that he places 
this passion mainly in the âme is drawn from the great effect 
which it has on the ability to judge, a primary operation of 
the âme. This conclusion could well be wrong in the light 
of modern information on the process of anger, but according 
to the information supplied by Montaigne, it could well be 
that this was another of those passions which he placed pri­
marily in the âme.
^^"Sur des vers de Virgile," p. 841.
36"Des coches," p. 891.
S^Ibid., pp. 877-878.
38"C'est folie de rapporter le vray et le faux à 
nostre suffisance," p. 181.
39"De la colere," p. 692.
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La Hayne presents a similar problem for classification,
but if one accepts colere as basically affecting the âme,
it would appear that the two belong in the same category.
"La colere et la hayne sont au delà du devoir 
de la justice, et sont passions servans seule­
ment à ceux qui ne tiennent pas assez à leur 
devoir par la raison s i m p l e . "40
Again, using Montaigne's own method, ^  hayne would be 
primarily of the âme because it is controllable by use of 
reason. If it reposed primarily in the body, it would not 
be so easily disposed of.
The corporal "passions," though separate, affect the 
other half of the self in a most intimate manner; "Les 
secousses et esbranlemens que nostre ame reçoit par les pas­
sions corporelles peuvent beaucoup en elle," but the great 
mover of the âme is still those "passions" which are native 
to itself: "Mais encore plus les siennes propres ausquelles
elle est si forte en prinse qu'il est à 1'adventure sousten- 
able qu'elle n'a aucune autre alleure et mouvement que du 
souffle de ses vents."^1
These "passions" and their effects come very close to 
painting Montaigne's picture of the average man. They are 
like chemicals, ever in motion, ever producing reactions in 
the âme and in the body. These reactions which are con­
strued to be the workings of a man are in reality in no way
40"De I'utilitie," p. 769.
41"l 'apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 550.
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related to the real self, the consciousness which should be
the guiding inspiration behind each action. To the contrary,
man is an automaton. Perhaps it would not be so bad if this
automaton were controlled by whatever there is of good in him,
but this is not the case:
"Nostre estre est simente de qualitez mala­
dives; 1'ambition, la jalousie, 1'envie, la 
vengence, la superstition, le desespoir logent 
en nous d'une si naturelle possession que 
l'image s'en reconnoist aussi aux bestes; 
voire et la cruauté, vice si dénaturé; car, 
au milieu de la compassion, nous sentons au 
dedans je ne sçay quelle aigre-douce poincte 
de volupté maligne à voir souffrir autruy; et 
les enfans le sentent;...Desquelles qualitez 
qui osteroit les semances en l'homme, des- 
truiroit les fondamentales conditions de 
nostre vie.' ^
Society is founded on these evils which have enslaved 
mankind. What would it be like if men were free? Unfortu­
nately, as we see it, that appears to be something with which 
there is no great need to concern oneself since such an even­
tuality is so far beyond the realm of the probable.
Montaigne apparently concurs with this for he writes: "Le
bien public requiert qu'on trahisse et qu'on mente et qu'on
massacre..."43
Apart from the various functions which were assigned to 
the âme, there exist other aspects of its operations which 
will be discussed as a power, or a lack of power which it pos­
sesses. These powers were not considered with the functions
42"De l'utilitié," pp. 767-768. 
43ibid., p. 768.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
because they appear to be a result of these functions and of 
the various traits which serve to make up the âme itself.
The following quotation from "Que le goust des bien et
des maux dépend en bonne partie de l'opinion que nous en
avons" provides a good spring board for the inception of this
particular discussion, for it outlines what are perhaps two
of the greatest powers which the âme possesses. The first
part of this quotation, marked a), was in the first edition
of the Essais, written, according to Villey, sometime between
1572 and 1574. The second part, marked c), was added in the
edition of 1595. (The letter "b" is reserved for additions
in the edition of 1588.)
a) "Ce qui nous fait souffrir avec tant 
d'impatience la douleur c'est de n'estre 
pas accoustumez de prendre nostre princi­
pal contentment en l'ame, c) de ne nous 
attendre point assez à elle,' qui est seule 
et souveraine maistresse de nostre conduite.
Elle est variable en toute sorte de formes, 
et renge à soy et à son estât, quel qu'il 
soit, les sentiments du corps et tous 
autres accidens. Pourtant la faut-il estu- 
dier et enquérir, et esveiller en elle ses 
ressors tout-puissans. Il n'y a raison, ny 
prescription, ny force, qui puisse contre 
son inclination et son c h o i s . "44
This statement reveals the fact that the âme is all 
powerful within itself. It indicates Montaigne's firm con­
viction that the individual contained within his own make up 
the power ultimately to determine his particular internal 
destiny. One might accidentally be able to determine his
^^"Que le goust des biens et des maux dépend en bonne 
partie de, l'opinion que nous en avons," p. 57.
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physical outcome, but he could be certain of the development 
of the interior self if only he chose to act. For the man who 
does choose such a course, nothing can restrain the self. It 
is contained by no physical bounds, and does not even have to 
receive the exterior world in any other fashion than that 
which it wills. It may fashion the symbols which it receives 
from reality outside of itself, making it take whatever form 
it finds desirable. Every signal which it receives from its 
partner, the body, is interpreted only in the light in which 
it wishes to view the signals. It has the power to be com­
pletely untouchable, to create its own reality. It is so 
pliable as to be able to mold itself into any shape or form 
that it may wish. Its very potentiality, as regards form, 
knows no regulations. It may choose a form and fix itself, 
or it may, as did Montaigne, forever remain in a fluid state, 
constantly moving, constantly reshaping, constantly growing.
The âme does not in reality consciously collect, shape 
and form according as it wills; rather, this process takes 
place from what the âme has previously made of itself. The 
process is a direct result of what has become of the agent 
itself. It is a ^  facto choosing, an automatic selection. 
This fact implies some limitations in the power of the âme 
which do not stem from its nature, but rather from its fail­
ure to actualize a potentiality:
"Pour juger des choses grandes et haultes, il 
faut un'ame de raesme, autrement nous leur 
attribuons le vice qui est le nostre. Un 
aviron doit semble courbe en l'eau. Il n'importe 
pas seulement qu'on voye la chose, mais
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comment on la voye."^^
The âme can only judge in the light of itself; but since 
it wills what it is, it wills the light in which it will ob­
serve reality. It will reduce or exalt all to its own level. 
There is a fixed station for nothing. Due to this very power 
which the inner self possesses, there exists a very basic 
weakness in its operations. That basic weakness is its in­
ability to arrive at objective or real truth, if such exists. 
It will view only those areas of absolute reality for which 
it has developed receptacles of perception. It will remain 
blind to all other aspects, making a judgment and formulating 
a concept based upon insufficient material. Its vision will 
then be untrue and, in a manner of speaking, unreal. It must 
forever grope about in the world surrounding it with only an 
inkling of its true concept. This situation is worsened by 
the fact that the only information about external reality is 
obtained through the senses which present in their turn only 
a few scanty aspects of this external reality. Therefore, 
what the self is left with is an interpretation of an inter­
pretation. It finds itself in a most difficult situation, as 
far as its ability to function in the external reality is 
concerned.
"L'incertitude de nos sens rend incertain tout 
ce qu'ils produisent."^®
45ibid., p. 68.
apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 584.
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And again:
"Et de dire que les passions des sens rap­
portent à l'ame la qualité des subjects 
estrangers par ressemblance, comment se peut 
l'ame et l'entendement asseurer de cette 
ressemblance, n'ayant de soy nul commerce 
avec les subjects estrangers."47
There remains therefore only one reality which is of the 
utmost importance to the self, and that is the internal real­
ity of the self, the âme. Here is where the important per­
sonal reality lies, and nature has made each individual the 
total reality obtainable to himself, a reality of which he is 
the unique and complete sovereign.
A second power which was expressed in the initial quota­
tion is the self's ability.to find happiness. This power 
lies in the very sovereignty which the âme possesses. Since 
all conditions are subject to the will, since it is only the 
interior reality which has any validity in the human con­
sciousness, there exists nothing which is actually good or 
bad, but rather what the self wills to make of any eventual­
ity. Even Fortune has no real complexion, other than that 
which is colored by the complexion of the self.
"La fortune ne nous fait ny bien ny mal: 
elle nous en offre seulement la matière et 
la semence, laquelle nostre ame, plus puis­
sante qu'elle, tourne et applique comme il 
luy plait, seule cause et maistresse de sa 
condition heureuse ou malheureuse."48
47ibid., p. 585.
4^"Que le goust des biens et des maux dépend en bonne 
partie de l'opinion que nous en avons," p. 67.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
It would be an over simplification of the situation to 
say that self knowledge and self control lead immediately to 
happiness and immunity from suffering. In reality there is 
another fact which must follow quickly on the heels of knowl­
edge and control. The individual must fit himself into the 
universal order of things.
Strowski has demonstrated that this "order" is based 
upon the acceptance of all that is useful to the maintenance 
of human and individual dignity. It is all that the indi­
vidual finds within himself which will lead to the development 
and perfection of his humanity; all that leads to happiness, 
confidence and contentment are, in effect, the manifestations 
on the natural order within the self.^^ In the very last 
Essai "De 1'experience," Montaigne himself explains at some 
length this same "universal order."
There is an apparent contradiction in Montaigne as re­
gards the power of externals and their relationship to happi­
ness, for he relates that there are most certainly two 
conditions which are able to make one unhappy. These are 
pain and poverty. He even goes so far as to consider them 
certain knowledge, a quality which he rarely attributes to 
anything else. Pain could be understood as an expression of 
what was already internalized, that is, there would be no 
pain if the self were not creating it from the sensations 
which it was receiving from externals. The pain then comes
^^Strowski, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
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from the internal and is expressed externally as a reflection 
of what is taking place in the self. The question of poverty 
is not so easily resolved unless, of course, one construes it 
as also representing an inner state just as does pain.
Quite obviously pain and poverty are related by the fact
that poverty is painful, so in effect there is only one real
problem to be resolved and that is the question of pain.
Here is what Montaigne writes about it.
"Icy tout ne consiste pas en l'imagination.
Nous opinions du reste, c'est icy la cer­
taine science, qui joué’ son rolle. Nos sens 
mesme en sont juges. Ferons nous à croire 
à nostre peau que les coups d'estriviere la 
chatouillent? Et à nostre gout que l'aloé 
soit du vin de Graves?"^®
It would appear that the body would be just as capable 
of going astray in its feelings as is the âme in its inter­
pretation of reality. Yet the feeling itself is certain 
knowledge whether or not it is based on real or supposed 
causes. Hence it might be taken that Montaigne means that 
pain is the only certain physical knowledge which can be 
possessed because it is not necessarily dependent upon pro­
per interpretation of signals. On the other hand, by this 
reasoning, pleasure should fall into the same category.
Another explanation of this thinking lies in the fact 
that this essay was written at the very earliest stage in his 
writing career. Perhaps this represents a first thought which
^^"Que le goust des biens et des maux dépend en bonne 
partie de l'opinion que nous en avons," p. 55.
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was later canceled out in the "Apologie" and following 
essais.
Viewing the matter from a distance, and in the light of 
previous discussions, it would appear that there do exist 
certain areas within itself over which the âme has no real 
control. The writer has in mind here the natural inclina­
tions which were previously discussed. Over these, the âme 
does not appear to have any control, for they are somehow 
representative of its very essence and do not really enter 
into the problem save as indications of what one must do to 
take his place in the "universal order of t h i n g s . I n  
reality, a certain control can be exercised over them, but it 
is very dubious whether or not this is a real control or 
simply a cover. It has been previously demonstrated that 
when these inclinations are not lived up to, severe unhappi­
ness results, whereupon it is uncertain which is the con­
troller and which is the controlled. Perhaps the true result 
is that no one is in control, hence the unhappiness.
Montaigne has made it very plain that he never went con­
trary to these natural inclinations, and so he tried to live 
within the framework of the "universal order of things."
This fact supplies the reader with perhaps still another ex­
planation for the Essais. To live in conformity with this 
absolute, it became necessary to keep a record of the effects
^^"De I'yvrongnerie," p. 328.
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produced by various modes of existence by recording the hap­
piness resulting on the one hand, and the unhappiness on the 
other hand. Montaigne was thus able to create for himself a 
description of just what the "universal order of things" was.
With all the control which an individual could have 
over his inner self, his body always remained, for Montaigne, 
an entirely different matter. He did not believe that the 
body and its functions and emotions were always controllable. 
He felt that this element in the makeup of man was too much 
subject to outside forces and interferences. He believed
that it was too easily shaken or overthrown. But one need
never consent to these physical weaknesses; he must only 
suffer them.
Even though he espouses this philosophy of the power of
the will, Montaigne does not ascribe to himself the ability
to right himself once he (the âme) has been overwhelmed by
any great passion. He writes:
"Si j'en estais un coup vaincu et atterré, 
je ne m'en releverois jamais bien entier.
Qui auroit fait perdre pied à mon ame, ne 
la remettrait jamais droicte en sa place; 
elle se retaste et recherche trop vifve- 
ment et profondement, et pourtant, ne lair-
rait jamais ressouder et consolider la plaie
qui 1'auroit p e r c é e . "52
It would seem that Montaigne felt that since he had so 
thoroughly given himself oyer to this great search and so 
committed himself to this philosophy which he had developed
Des coches," pp. 877-878.
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over a whole lifetime, if he fell there would be nothing 
left for him to cling to. His whole modus vivendi would 
have gone down with him. Everything he stood for would have 
had to be re-examined and re-evaluated. This represented 
the work of a lifetime and was beyond the realm of possibil­
ity. We see in this no indication that he actually believed 
such a disaster would take place, but he raises the hypothet­
ical situation to demonstrate his total commitment. He did 
not actually question the power of his will, but was only 
demonstrating a point, somewhat like wondering what one would 
do if, after a lifetime of preparation, there happened to be 
no life after death.
There is one more power which the âme possesses, the 
ability to arise beyond the human condition, but this will be 
better discussed in the following chapter which concerns 
itself with the question of the good self and will be better 
understood in the light of the other matters which will be 
discussed there.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE GOOD AND THE VIRTUOUS SELF 
Frederick Kellermann, in his article "Montaigne's 'plus 
excellens hommes,'" traces the development of Montaigne's 
admiration for and his classification of certain great men 
of antiquity. In the final analysis, he maintains, after 
1580 or 1588 Montaigne had settled upon Socrates, 
Epaminondas, Alcibiades, and perhaps the Scipios "as repre­
sentatives of his 'plus grands hommes.'"̂  Since Michel de 
Montaigne was first of all consistent in the fact that he 
admired these men, and secondly, because he placed them in 
the highest category of admirable persons after he had fully 
formed his self, it would appear that these people represent 
vivid examples of what he considered the good self to be. 
Unfortunately, he does not go into a detailed study of the 
lives of these men, but rather used them as examples of some 
quality which he is attempting to demonstrate.
One of the qualities for which he uses them as examples 
is orderliness and self-control. In "Des plus excellens 
hommes" he writes:
"Le tiers et le plus excellent, à mon gré, 
c'est Epaminondas. De gloire, il n'en a pas
^Frederick Kellermann, "Montaigne's 'Plus Excellens 
Hommes,'" The Romanic Review, LV, No. 3, (1964), p. 180.
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beaucoup près tant que d'autres (aussi 
n'est-ce pas une piece de la substance de 
la chose); de resolution et de vaillance, 
non pas de celle qui est esquisse par 
l'ambition, mais de celle que la sapience 
et la raison peuvent planter en une ame 
bien réglée, il en avait tout ce qui s'en 
peut imaginer."^
The same is said of Socrates, that his self was so well 
ordered that he acted "non par saillies mais par complex­
ion . " ̂
Mien a man completely knows himself and has complete 
control of himself, he is reaching toward the heights of per­
fection. Montaigne was far too wise to believe that this 
state was generally attainable, and perhaps he did not even 
believe that it was attainable by himself, but at least this 
must be the general direction in which one traveled. To the 
degree that one knows and controls his âme, self, to that 
same degree is he in a state of goodness.
A manifestation of the "ame bien réglée" is its exer­
cising of gentleness, kindness, and general humanity, its 
respect for its co-sufferers.
"J'ay autre fois logé Epaminondas au 
premier rang des hommes excellens, et 
ne m'en desdy pas. Jusques où montoit 
il la consideration de son particulier 
devoir! Qui ne tua jamais homme qu'il 
eust vaincu; qui, pour ce bien inestimable 
de rendre la liberté à son pays, faisoit 
conscience de tuer un Tyran ou ses com­
plices sans les formes de la justice; et 
qui jugeoit meschant homme, quelque bon
^"Des plus excellens hommes," p. 734. 
^"De la phisionomie," p. 1,014.
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Citoyen qu'il fut, celuy qui, entre les 
ennemys et en la bataille n'espargnoit 
son aitiy et son hoste. Voylà une ame de 
riche composition. Il marioit aux plus 
rudes et violentes actions humaines la 
bonté et l'humanité, voire la plus deli­
cate qui se treuve en l'escole de la 
Philosophie."4
Montaigne is impressed with generosity, with gentleness. 
Those who were inflicting death and destruction upon their 
fellow men were exhibiting "ames des-reglées." He writes of 
Julius Caesar: "J'abomine les enhortemens enragez de cette
ame d e s - r e g l é e . T h e  civil wars and the human misery which 
were being inflicted upon the poor citizenry were represen­
tative of a self which was inferior, because it ignored a 
concern which was very basic to the good self. This lack of 
humanity betrayed the self as being inferior, not only 
because humanity v;as considered a basic need, but also 
because, as Strowski has pointed out, this type of self is a 
great deal less than free, and freedom is one of the more 
basic prerequisites for the good self.
Not only does Montaigne expect this sensitivity for 
human life and suffering to exist in the character of the 
good self, but he.goes even further, expecting that the self 
will be even childishly simple in its love of and its commu­
nication with others. Concerning'Epaminondas again he 
writes :
4"De l'utile et de I'honneste," pp. 779-780. 
^Ibid., p. 781.
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"Le plus doux contentement qu'il eust en 
toute sa vie, il tesmoigna que c'estoit le 
plaisir qu'il avoit donné à son pere et à 
sa mere de sa victoire de Leuctres; il 
couche de beaucoup, préférant leur plaisir 
au sien, si juste et si plein d'une tant 
glorieuse action."6
He is reciting a close communication of love between 
child and parent, a basic simplicity which he carries still 
further as he admires Epaminondas, and the elder Scipio as 
well as Socrates for the way in which they were able to en­
gage openly in infantile games and pursuits. He sums it all 
up saying: "Le relâchement et facilité honore, ce semble, à
^  nmerveilles et sied mieux à une ame forte et genereuse."
The good self is most certainly sincere. In the light 
of the discussion of the previous chapters it is quite obvi­
ous that the lie and the good self are in direct opposition 
to one another. These great historical figures for whom he 
held such great admiration were able to stand forth complete­
ly fearless before their fellow men, secure in the knowledge 
that all their actions had been done according to their best 
conscience. On this sincerity hinged all honor and right­
eousness. Sincerity and conscience become in a way the 
measure of all goodness. Of Epaminondas he writes:
"Mais quant à ses meurs et conscience, il a 
de bien loing surpassé tous ceux qui se sont 
jamais meslé de manier affaires. Car en 
cette partie, qui seule doit estre princi­
palement considérée, qui seule marque
^"Des plus excellens hommes," p. 736. 
7"De 1'experience," p. 1,089.
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véritablement quels nous sommes, et laquelle 
je contrepoise seule à toutes les autres 
ensemble, il ne cede à aucun philosophe, non 
pas à Socrates m e s m e . "8
Montaigne, of course, applied these principles to his 
ov7n life so that he became respected by all sides in the civil 
wars, not because of neutrality, as some might think, for 
Montaigne was not neutral, but for his veracity. A prince 
could always expect Montaigne to do exactly as he said he 
would, whether he were for or against the particular cause.
In "De l'institution des enfants," Montaigne makes a
statement on this sincerity and simplicity which is quoted
here because it illustrates further his feeling on this
point, and because it is almost as though the author were
giving a description of himself in these words:
"Que sa conscience et sa vertue reluisent 
en son parler et n'ayent que la raison pour 
guide. Qu'on luy face entendre que de con­
fesser la faute qu'il descouvrira en son 
propre discours, encore qu'elle ne soit 
aperceuë que par luy, c'est un effet de 
jugement et de sincérité, qui sont les prin­
cipales, parties qu'il cherche, que 
l'opiniatrer et contester sont qualitez 
communes, plus apparentes aux plus basses 
ames; que se raviser et se corriger, abon- 
donner un mauvais party sur le cours de son 
ardeur, ce sont qualitez rares, fortes et 
philosophiques."?
This good faith will manifest itself in a very open kind 
of simplicity. It will reflect itself to the outside world 
with a crystal clear, uncomplicated transparency. It will be
^"Des plus excellens hommes," p. 735. 
^"De l'institution des enfants," p. 154.
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in many ways like a child, innocently proclaiming what he
feels, believes, and in the final analysis, what he is.
"Un coeur genereux ne doit point desmentir 
ses pensées; il se veut faire voir jusques 
au dedans. Ou tout y est bon, ou au moins 
tout y est humein."lu
It is not necessary to be what the world may term 
"good;" one need only be human. It may be that he will have 
one day to act contrary to what he feels is good, he may 
find it necessary to go back on his word, but he must still 
be human if he can not be "good." If he can still be 
human, he is demonstrating the perfection which lies within 
the self.
"Le Prince, quand une urgente circonstance 
et quelque impétueux et inopiné accident du 
besoing de son estât luy faict gauchir sa 
parolle et sa fo . . . .11 le falloit faire; 
mais s'il le fit sans regret, s'il ne luy
greva de le faire, c'est signe que sa con­
science est en mauvais termes.
As understandable as it might be to be forced into some­
thing which betrays sincerity, it is permissable to do so if 
one at least feels some remorse at having to do so. Perhaps 
the greater or the better course of action would be to accept
some kind of martyrdom to sincerity rather than compromise it:
"Quand il s'en trouveroit quelqu'un de si 
tendre conscience, à qui nulle guarison ne 
semblast digne d'un si poisant remede, je 
ne l'en estimeroy pas moins. Il en se 
sçauroit perdre plus excusablement et décem­
ment. Nous ne pouvons pas tout. Ainsi comme
^®"De la praesumption," p. 630.
^^"De l'utile et de I'honneste," p. 777.
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ainsi, nous faut il souvent, comme à la 
derniere ancre, remettre la protection de 
nostre vaisseau à la pure conduitte du ciel.
A quelle plus juste nécessité se reserve 
il? Que luy est-il moins possible à faire 
que ce qu'il ne peut faire qu'aux despens 
de sa foy et de son honneur, choses qui à 
1'aventure luy doivent estre plus cheres 
que son propre salut, ouy, et que le salut 
de son peuple?
It is not to be thought that honor is the important
factor in this sincerity, at least not public honor. If a
situation were to arise in which one had to lose face in
order to be sincere, then he must do so.
"Toute personne d'honneur choisit de perdre 
plustost son honneur, que de perdre sa 
conscience,"13
There exists nothing which can be ranked above sincerity.
The good self is orderly. The Essais are permeated with 
this cry for order. "Le pris de l'ame ne consiste pas à 
aller haut, mais ordonnéement."14 This price which he places 
on order reflects the fact that he held self-control in a 
position of primary importance. This order not only applies 
to consistency of individual actions, but as well to the di­
rection in which an individual progresses.
"L'ame qui n'a point de but estably, elle se 
perd; car, comme on dit, c'est n'estre en 
aucun lieu, que d'estre par tout."15
l^Ibid., pp. 777-778. 
15"De la gloire," p. 614. 
14"Du repentir," p. 787. 
15"De l'oisiveté," p. 34.
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One must always be careful of interpreting this order 
as a limiting agent in the individual, such as was considered 
in the discussion on freedom. This is a different kind of 
order which is not binding on the self but which acts as a 
tool for arriving at an end. It may be dropped at a moment's 
notice and exchanged for another plan of progress. The indi­
vidual is in no way obligated to the form of the order he 
chooses, but only perhaps to the purpose or goal for which 
its formulation was intended. The particular order repre­
sents only a completely relative and expendable implement.
However this may be, Montaigne made no great secret of
his great admiration for order, and this he did in, a most
personal way. He used his own life as the example.
"La recommandation que chacun cherche, de 
vivacité et promptitude d'esprit, je la pre­
tends du règlement; d'une action esclatante 
et signalée, ou de quelque particulière 
suffisance, je la pretends de l'ordre, cor­
respondance et tranquillité d'opinions et
de meurs."16
The world is so filled with possible goals that one 
might disintegrate if he sought to allow himself to seek them 
all. His orderly conduct was for him more relevant to his 
own existence than all the other flashes of genius which he 
saw exposed around him. His was to be another kind of genius, 
one which would flash brilliantly in the annals of men, but 
which would have to be built and nursed throughout a life­
time. Yet, in consideration of the span of man's search for
l^"De la praesumption," p. 542.
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truth, the few years that he spent on this earth and the 
achievements which he made during these few years, appear 
not as a small flash in his own time, but as a light which 
is continuing to shine through the ages, a steady glow which 
will not so quickly or easily disappear.
With, an orderly self, a pervading tranquility should
make itself apparent in the individual. In actual fact, this
is in itself one of the essential qualities of the good self;
it is tranquil. It was toward this state that Montaigne set
his sail when he began to examine himself, and it was in this
state that he wished to take his pride.
"Toute la gloire que je pretens de ma vie, 
c'est de l'avoir vescue tranquille: tran­
quille non selon Metrodorus, ou Arcesilas, 
ou Aristippus, mais selon moy."l?
"J'essaie à tenir mon ame et mes pensées 
en repos."1°
The first quotation immediately dispels any false idea 
that one might have about the nature of this tranquility and 
conformity. The author makes it very clear that there can 
only exist a personal tranquility which comes of being one­
self and which hinges entirely on the development which the 
self must undergo during its life span. This is a tranquil­
ity which comes of being free, of being sincere, of being in 
pursuit of one's destiny, of being in step with that "uni­
versal order of things" which was discussed in the third
l^"De la gloire," p. 605.
"De mesnager sa volonté," p. 998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
chapter. But, one must never confuse this tranquility with
complacency, for complacency could only be a part of the
lives of two groups of people neither of which Montaigne was,
nor aspired to be, and in either case, the good self felt
itself automatically excluded.
"Car il n'y a satisfaction çà bas que pour 
les ames, ou brutales ou divines."^9
The reasons for Montaigne's excluding the good self from 
the brutal ones is rather evident. The fact that he also 
excludes it from those which are divine will be discussed a 
little farther on since his reasons for such an exclusion 
would not be immediately evident. But, there is a tranquili­
ty arising out of sincerity and an established goal which is 
not only attainable by the good self, but which is required 
of it and necessary to the nature of the matter.
In connection with this tranquility, we have mentioned 
the fact that it is being in step with the "universal order 
of things" which finally brings it about. One of the essen­
tial facts of the search for the self is the coincidence of 
the self with the universal realities. Man is by nature a 
part of this order, even though for the most part he does not 
understand it. When he comes to an understanding of himself, 
he can then play his part in this universal order. If he does 
this, if he acts according to what he truly is, he will not 
be in conflict, in an absurd conflict with the only reality
^^"De la vanité," p. 966.
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which there is; for when he lives contrary to what is, he 
lives contrary to himself as well. The self must seek out 
its part in the universal order, and play it. If one is 
doing this, then there is no reason at all for anxiety, there 
can exist only tranquility, only beauty in the harmony of the 
universe.
The natural interests of the self will, of course, be
those which are in step with the order of the universe.
"Les moins tandues et plus naturelles 
alleures de nostre ame sont les plus belles; 
les meilleures occupations, les moins ef­
forcées . "20
The mistaken idea which Montaigne had of the happiness 
of the savages of Brasil stems in part, of course, from what 
he had heard about them from travelers, but also in large 
part from this feeling which he had for natural harmony. He 
envisioned these people in a state so primitive that they had 
never learned any of those civilized ideas which removed 
them from the functioning of nature. They came into a world 
which was natural and so they were automatically acting in 
conformity with nature and with the universal order.
Not only does tranquility distinguish the good man, but 
it exposes the sage as well, but then the self which is 
ideally formed is indeed a sage. Here is what Montaigne 
writes on this subject:
20"De trois commerces," p. 798.
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"La plus expresse marque de la sagesse, c'est 
un esjouissance constante; son estât est 
comme des choses au dessus de la Lune : tou-
j ours serein."21
In terms of the values of the average man, Montaigne's 
good self would be at best mediocre. Men generally have the 
tendency to push whatever they espouse to the extreme, and 
in Montaigne's day, it was quite evident where these extremes 
led, to human misery. To him, the best cause was that of 
seeking to avoid causes. In his mind, there was nothing which 
was absolutely certain, hence there was nothing worthy of dis­
rupting society or even an individual life. But even if 
something appeared to be unquestionably good, an extreme of 
it was bad, even extreme knowledge was undesirable. The 
functions must be kept delicately balanced, never leaning too 
far in any direction.
"Aux actions des hommes insansez, nous voyons 
combien proprement s'avient la folie avecq les 
plus vigoureuses operations de nostre ame.
Qui ne sçait combien est imperceptible le 
voisinage d'entre la folie avecq les gaillardes 
elevations d'un esprit libre et les effects 
d'une vertu supreme et extraordinaire."22
"Gailus Vibius banda si bien son ame à com­
prendre l'essence et les mouvemens de la 
folie, qu'il emporta son jugement hors de son 
siege, si qu'onques puis il ne l'y peut re­
mettre; et se pouvoit vanter d'estre devenu
fol par sagesse."23
2^"De l'institution des enfants," p. 160. 
22"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 471.
23"De la force de l'imagination," p. 95.
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This mediocrity must not be confused with weakness, for 
it represented just the opposite trait. To maintain the 
middle way, a will of iron was required. To know where the 
middle way lay, all the resources for astute observation had 
to be exhausted. To refrain from being swept away in the 
religious, political and social excitement of the times, a 
self-sufficient sterling character was an absolute necessity, 
for who can stand against what everyone else is doing. It is 
by far the easier thing to follow blindly along than to seek 
out and to hold to the middle road which somehow always seems 
to be closer to the truth.
In his final essay, "De 1'experience," Montaigne sums
this up as follows :
"La grandeur de I'ame n'est pas tant tirer à 
mont et tirer avant comme sçavoir se ranger 
et circonscrire. Elle tient pour grand tout 
ce qui est assez, et montre sa hauteur à 
aimer mieux les choses moyennes que les 
eminentes."24
There is another mediocrity which becomes apparent in 
the good self, a mediocrity which rests in its absolute con­
formity to the demands of its social culture. It must, how­
ever, be clearly understood that this conformity is 
exclusively an external one. We have already pointed out 
that he made no internal concessions at all. But the fact of 
the matter is that the individual has to live in a society 
and so he has to meet the demands of this society or bring
24"De 1'experience," pp. 1,090-1,091.
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about unhappiness for himself and others. He makes this 
statement in the following quotation, which is admittedly a 
little worn from being so often quoted, but which expresses 
his attitude very well. He writes at the end of the criti­
cism of manners and styles:
"Ces considerations ne destournent pourtant 
pas un homme d 'entendement de suivre le stille 
commun; ains, au rebours, il me semble que 
toutes façons escartées et particulières par­
tent plustost de folie ou d'affectation 
ambitieuse, que de vraye raison; et que le sage 
doit au dedans retirer son ame de la presse, 
et la tenir en liberté et puissance de juger 
librement des choses ; mais, quant au dehors, 
qu'il doit suivre entièrement les façons et
formes receues,"^^
Actually, the well-developed self should have no diffi­
culty in conforming to these externals, for he would be hard 
put to it to prove that any given substitute would better re­
place the original. Only time could bear this out, and time 
is on the side of the established customs.
How strongly Montaigne felt about obedience in general
is reflected in this statement from the "Apologie":
"La premiere loy que Dieu donna jamais à 
l'homme, ce fust une loy de pure obéissance; 
ce fust un commandement nud et simple où 
l'homme n'eust rien à connoistre et à causer; 
d'autant que l'obeyr est le principal office 
d'une ame raisonnable, recognoisisant un 
celeste supérieur et bienfaicteur.
25"De la coustume de et de ne changer aisément une 
loy receüe," p. 117.
"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 467.
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This obedience which Montaigne would require of each 
man, in religion as well as in society, would make him the 
strictest conformist. His good individual would appear to 
its fellows as common as possible, yet he would in fact be 
the most uncommon individual in the society.
In a sense, the good self is alone. Strowski maintains 
that Montaigne received this feeling from the Stoics, but 
whether it comes from this source or not, this idea is pres-
n nent throughout the Essais. There is the ever-present
demand that the individual so separate himself from his sur­
roundings that any loss whatsoever will not be grievous to 
himself, as long as he has his integrity intact.
It would appear doubtful that Montaigne was being en­
tirely objective in this matter. Was he perhaps embittered 
by the death of La Boetie, by the death of so many children? 
If he really believed this immunity to be a perfection, one
can be fairly certain that he never reached it himself. As
has been pointed out, a scholar such as Francis Jeanson does 
not in fact accept this aspect of the author’s philosophy 
insofar as he himself is concerned. Montaigne himself tells 
the reader that he never fully recovered from the death of 
La Boetie. Also, one must consider this statement from 
"De L'exercitation"; - ' - —
"Je n'imagine aucun estât pour moy si insup­
portable et horrible que d'avoir l'ame vife
2?Strowski, 0£. cit., pp. 104-105.
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et affligée, sans moyen de se declarer . . ."28 
If one considers this statement along with what he 
writes about being unable to enjoy anything without communi­
cating it, a most definite need becomes apparent, and this 
need cannot be satisfied from within; it is the need for 
human communication.
Yet, despite its withdrawal in one sense, and its con­
formity in another, the good self, the tranquil self, can be 
one of action when called upon to render service. It will 
be as great in its actions as it is in its own development.29 
It will not act on the spur of the moment, nor will it act 
harshly unless absolutely necessary. The individual will 
reach the same height in the thoroughness and purity of his 
actions as he has in his own self. In his own daily exis­
tence, he will have the wisdom to undertake those tasks, and 
establish those goals which are within his reach. There are 
too many of this kind to be obtained; one need not concern 
himself with the others. The obtainable ones are the natural 
ones; the unattainable are man-made. By this means the self 
can be ever progressing and yet ever in the state of being 
rewarded, and in the final analysis, content.
Returning once more to examining Montaigne’s concept of 
the good self by way of his "plus excellens hommes," 
Alcibiades brings forth another factor for consideration:
2B"De l'exercitation," pp. 354-355. 
29"Du pedantisme," p. 134.
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"J'ay souvent remarqué avec grand' admiration 
la merveilleuse nature d'Alcibiades, de se 
transformer si aisément à façons si diverses, 
sans interest de sa santé; surpassant tantost 
la somptuosité et pompe Persienne, tantost 
1'austérité et frugalité Lacedemonienne; 
autant reformé en Sparte comme voluptueux en 
Ionië."30
On the surface, this statement would seem to apply 
simply to a physical adaptability, but the author also had 
another kind of adaptability in mind, and that was a spirit­
ual kind.
Michel de Montaigne was a great believer in the develop­
ment of the physical capabilities of the individual. To him 
this was extremely important for the complete development of 
the inner self. He felt the connection between the functions 
of the body and of the âme were so interwoven that the âme 
was in danger of not developing to the extent that the body 
was undeveloped. Attention has been called to the fact that 
he felt physical deformity to be somehow very closely con­
nected to spiritual inadequacy. To him, an impotency on the 
part of the body very probably represented an impotency on 
the part of the âme. The inability of the body to adjust to 
all possible circumstances could very well signify that there 
existed circumstances to which the âme found itself unable to 
adapt. The physical self must be able to accommodate and 
perform even the so-called undesirable actions. In his essay 
on education he wrote:
^^"De l'institution des enfants," pp. 166-167.
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"Le corps encore souple, on le doit, à cette 
cause, plier à toutes façons et coustumes.
Et pourveu qu'on puisse tenir 1'appétit et 
la volonté soubs boucle, qu'on rende hardi­
ment un jeune homme commode à toutes nations 
et compaignies, voire au desreglement et 
aus excès, si besoing est. Son exercitation 
suive l'usage. Qu'il puisse faire toutes 
choses, et n'ayme à faire que les bonnes."31
It was Montaigne's desire that weakness never be mis­
taken for virtue. It was far better that an individual be 
able to do evil if he so desired than to delude himself into 
thinking that he was not so doing because he was good. In 
effect, how could one exercise his goodness if he were unable 
to do evil. So it becomes necessary that the good self have 
finely developed even its capabilities for evil.
"C'est estre, mais ce n'est pas vivre, que se 
tenir attaché et obligé par nécessité à un 
seul train. Les plus belles ames sont celles 
qui ont plus de variété et de s o u p p l e s s e . "32
With the feeling that he had for his personal freedom, 
this suppleness became an absolute necessity. Were he not 
able to adapt and adjust, he would be placing himself in a 
prison of his own making. The self must be kept in an abso­
lute fluid state with all possible choices available to it, 
and it must be kept in such a state to first of all recognize 
these choices, and secondly to be able to actualize them 
once they have been determined as desirable to the individual, 
This fact was another element in the building of serenity.
31lbid., p. 166.
32'«De trois commerces," p. 796.
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for the self could never be shaken since it was never fixed 
enough for this to occur. It was never so culturally or dog­
matically impeded as to lose direction if ever any of its 
beliefs and attachments were ever rendered unreal or doubtful. 
It was simply able to move in another direction.
Again, there is some doubt as to whether Montaigne ever 
achieved this state for himself, for we have noted that he 
had some misgivings about what would happen to him if ever 
any great emotion were able to shake him. On this matter we 
must let the discussion from the previous chapter stand.
It is to Socrates that we look now for final exemplifi­
cation of Montaigne's good self. In this final respect, he 
and Socrates coincide, as regards what they intended to be. 
Socrates wanted to be wise, so did Montaigne; Socrates wanted 
to be a whole man, so did Montaigne. The outcome of this 
admixture is a wise man, which is exactly what Montaigne 
strove to be, and what in the final analysis he was.
"Un attouchement, et fortuite, et par une 
espaule, aller eschauffer et altérer une ame 
refroidie et esnervée par 1'aage, et la 
premiere de toutes les humaines en reforma­
tion! Pourquoy non, dea? Socrates estoit 
homme; et ne voulait ny estre, ny sembler 
autre chos e . "33
The greatest thing that a man can do is enjoy his being,
enjoy to the fullest his humanity.
"II n'est rien si beau et legitime que de 
faire bien l'homme et deuëment, ny science 
si ardue que de bien et naturellement sçavoir
^^"Sur des vers de Virgile," p. 870.
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vivre cette vie; et de nos maladies la plus 
sauvage, c'est mespriser nostre e s t r e . "34
The greatest fools in Montaigne's eyes are those who
seek to rise above what they are. This can never be, for men
are men and can never be other than what they are.
"Nostre esprit n'a volontiers pas assez d'autres 
heures à faire ses besongnes, sans se desas­
socier du corps en ce peu d'espace quil luy 
faut pour sa_ nécessité. Ils veulent se mettre 
hors d'eux et eschapper à l'homme. C'est folie; 
au lieu de se transformer en anges, ils se 
transforment en bestes; au lieu de se hausser,
ils s'abattent."35
The closest one can come to divinity is to act his part 
in nature, to follow as closely as possible on her heels; to 
act in conformity with nature means to be as human as abso­
lutely possible.
"J'ay pris, comme j'ay diet ailleurs, bien
simplement et cruement pour mon regard ce
precept ancien: que nous ne sqaurions
faillir à suivre nature, que le souverain 
precepte c'est de se conformer à e l l e . "36
Man is called to this divinely, and he must be held ac­
countable for his humanity.37 It is by this that he is 
judged; it is with this in mind that he must act.
Montaigne considered this advice so important that he
closed the Essais with it. In the final paragraph he synthe­
sizes what he has maintained throughout his long work, and he
34"De 1'experience," p. 1,091.
De 1'experience," p. 1,096.
^^"De la phisionomie," pp. 1,036-1,037. 
37Ibid., p. 1,095.
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does it thus in very short form: "Les plus belles vies
sont, à mon gré, celles qui se rangent au mode lie commun et 
humain, avec ordre, mais sans miracle et sans extravagance!"^®
So far in this discussion of the good self, we have 
avoided considering the problem of virtue and its relation to 
the good self. The writer feels that Montaigne never actually 
drew a distinguishing line between simple goodness and virtue, 
at least not a consistent one. We do feel, however, that 
there is an overall distinction which is made, even though in 
certain individual circumstances it may seem not to apply.
So it is that we shall try to make a distinction which will 
tend to hold true generally but not necessarily for certain 
particular instances.
The reader is presented with what might be considered
Montaigne's final definition of virtue, for it is found in
the last book of the Essais and was inserted in the last 16th
century publication. It reads as follows:
"La douleur, la volupté, l'amour, la haine sont 
les premieres choses que sent un enfant; si la 
raison survenant, elles s'appliquent à elle, 
cela c'est vertu.
With this definition, virtue becomes simply a reasonable 
conduct of life, and one would have a very difficult time 
distinguishing between it and simple goodness. It is diffi­
cult to accent this as the final word on his definition
3®Ibid., p. 1,096.
39Ibid., p. 1,091.
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because of the point he has made of always making it clear 
that he does not speak to the individuals who by some gift or 
other are able to practice virtue in a stoic manner, but 
rather to those average mediocre men who are seeking a proper 
conduct of life. He makes no claim to mysticism or heroism, 
although he does recognize it in others.^0 in the following 
quotation, which was also added in the last 16th century pub­
lication of his Essais, one can find this attitude not only 
implied, but clearly stated.
"II me semble que la vertu est chose autre et 
plus noble que les inclinations à la bonté qui 
naissent en nous. Les ames réglées d'elles 
mesmes et bien nées, elles suyvent mesme train, 
et représentent en leurs actions mesme visage 
que les vertueuses. Mais la vertu sonne je ne 
sqay quoi de plus grand et de plus actif que 
de se laisser, par une heureuse complexion, 
doucement et paisiblement conduire à la suite 
de la raison. Celuy qui, d'une douceur et 
facilité naturelle, mespriseroit les offences 
receues, feroit chose très-belle et digne de 
louange; mais celuy qui, picqué et outré 
jusques au vif d'une offence, s'armeroit des 
armes de la raison contre ce furieux appétit 
de vengeance, et après un grand conflict s'en 
rendroit en fin maistre, feroit sans doubte 
beaucoup plus. Celuy-là feroit bien, et 
cettuy-cy vertueusement; l'une action se 
pourroit dire bonté; l'autre, vertu."41
In the light of this quotation it becomes immediately 
apparent that the Essais do not portray a self seeking to be 
virtuous, but one simply trying to become good. They are 
not a manual for sanctity, but rather one for humanity.
4°ibid., p. 1,095.
41"De la cruauté," pp. 400-401.
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Somehow, this excerpt just does not seem to be in step 
with his other references to virtue, but in the light of the 
Essais as a whole, it appears to us that it represents 
exactly the manner in which he conducted himself in reference 
to these two qualities.
Perhaps the reader of the Essais needs to understand
that a virtuous self will also be a good self, but a self may
be good and not necessarily virtuous. If this is what he had
in mind, it then becomes evident that essentially what he was
trying to do was to contradict the picture of virtue which
is commonly held, that it is unpleasant, that it rejects the
joy of human life, that it always wears a stern face and in
general that its pleasure belongs to the next world rather
than to this. Ee comes back so often to this one point, that
virtue is not actually forbidding, but rather inviting, that
it becomes apparent that he is reacting forcibly to an idea
with which he in no wise agrees. He calls to witness those
men of antiquity who were generally considered paragons of
virtue and demonstrates that they were also individuals who
were happy and enjoyed life, enjoyed life more than those who
did not practice virtue.
"La malice hume la plus part de son propre venin 
et s'en empoisonne. Le vice laisse, comme un 
ulcere en la chair, une repentance en l'ame, 
qui, tousjours s'esgratigne et s'ensanglante
elle m e s m e . "42
42"Du repentir," p. 784.
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If vice were able to make man constantly unhappy, virtue 
had just the opposite effect, it could make him happy always, 
no matter what befell him.
Pierre Moreau says that Montaigne sought to change the 
sense of the term "vertue" which etymologically means "vigor" 
to the more favored term "pleasure." He maintains also that 
this is a kind of virtue which lulls the conscience to 
sleep.43 It appears to us, however, that he has failed, 
first of all, to distinguish "vertue" from "bonté" in 
Montaigne, and secondly, that he has ignored the fact that 
those who practice virtue even in its most strenuous form 
consider it to be pleasing. It goes so far as to become 
something of an addiction. It is easily enough admitted 
that Montaigne sought to follow a natural course, but it is 
to be wondered if this is not in itself a strenuous course. 
The natural course should be the easiest if man were in a 
"natural" state, but he is not. He lives in a society, in a 
tradition, and according to Montaigne, in a prison. It is 
natural for him to seek to escape from this prison, but the 
author of the Essais' own personal anguish demonstrates that 
it is not an easy matter. It is our hope that the foregoing 
chapters have clearly demonstrated this to be so. We fail 
to see how living according to one's conscience and in com­
pliance with one's nature can in any wise be construed as an 
easy task, as a lulling task.
43]vioreau, 0£. cit., pp. 100-101.
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Actually, there is no quarrel with Moreau's belief that 
Montaigne was equating pleasure with virtue, J.f it is under­
stood that he was not equating every pleasure with virtue. 
Montaigne did indeed.believe that virtue was pleasurable, and 
on a road strewn with flowers,
"Elle a pour son but la vertu, qui n'est pas, 
comme dit I'eschole, plantée à la teste d'un 
mont coupé, rabotteux et inaccessible. Ceux 
qui l'ont approchée, la tiennent, au rebours, 
logée dans une belle plaine fertile et 
fleurissante, d'où elle voit bien souz soy 
toutes choses; mais si peut on y arriver, qui 
en sçait l'addresse, par des routes ombrageuses, 
gazonnées et doux fleurantes, plaisamment et 
d'une pante facile et polie, comme est celle 
des voûtes celestes."^4
Is this not dealing with one of the fundamental absurd­
ities of man? He seeks happiness with all his might, but 
avoids the very things which will make him happy, and takes 
pleasure in what will make him unhappy.
To bring this discussion to a close, we would suggest 
that the road, the address which Montaigne mentions in the 
above quotation, is simple human goodness— personal goodness 
which must come before virtue, true virtue. Those so-called 
virtuous acts of self-denial and the like which appear so 
frightening and rigorous to the average person are not really 
so painful as they seem, for the individual has been pre­
pared for them by the very fact that he is virtuous. In his 
austerity, a virtuous self may find as much pleasure as the 
licentious man in his indulgences; in reality, he finds more.
^^"De l'institution des enfants, pp. 160-161.
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but it is a different kind. It is a kind which resides deep 
within the self, rather than in the senses, it is part and 
parcel of the very fabric of this self. It is a very per­
sonal phenomenon which needs no external approbation. It is 
followed for its own sake and cannot be counterfeited.^^
Perhaps what might be said generally about all of this 
is that the common man's goal is simple goodness. If he 
directs and faithfully adheres to his own natural inclina­
tions, if he holds his own against the intruders, he will be 
good and natural. If he becomes good and is made of a 
stronger stuff, he will seek to be virtuous, and he will be 
the happier for it. Montaigne narrates his trip to goodness; 
the virtuous man will know where to go from there.
^^"De l'inconstance de nos actions," p. 320.
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CHAPTER V 
THE ESPRIT
This discussion does not seek to explain in detail 
Michel de Montaigne's concept of the term "esprit," nor does 
it endeavor to analyze thoroughly this concept's function in 
his philosophy. That would, indeed, be a major undertaking 
in itself. It is our hope that we will be able to distinguish 
it from the concept âme, at least in some respects, and to 
view it generally in the light of the description of the self.
The definition of this term itself poses not a few 
problems, primarily because it never seems to have been pre­
cisely defined. It has traditionally remained a catch-all 
word for anything not possessed of a visible body, and very 
often would seem to coincide in meaning with the term "âme". 
Yet, the author at times uses these two terms in a single 
expression, and in such a fashion as to imply a very definite 
distinction between them. The following quotations are ex­
amples of this kind of usage.
"II a un corps, il a une ame: les sens le 
poussent, l'esprit l'agite."
"Ce sont là préceptes espineux et mal plai- 
sans, et des mots vains et descharnez, où 
il n'y a point de prise, rien qui vous 
esveille l'esprit. En cette cy, l'ame
^"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 486.
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trouve où mordre et où se paistre. Ce 
fruict est plus grand, sans comparaison, 
et si sera plustost meury."^
"C'est aussi chastrer nos appétits desor­
donnez, d'esmousser cette cupidité qui nous 
espoinçonne à l'estude des livres, et priver 
l'ame de cette complaisance voluptueuse qui 
nous chatouille par l'opinion de science.
Et est richement accomplir le voeu de pau­
vreté, d'y joindre encore celle de l'esprit."3
"Lorsque la jalousie saisit ces pauvres ames 
foibles et sans resistance, c'est pitié comme 
elle les tirasse et tyrannise cruellement; 
elle s'y insinue sous tiltre d'amitié; mais 
depuis qu'elle les possédé, les mesmes 
causes qui servoient de fondement à la 
bienvueillance serve de fondement de hayne 
capitale. C'est des maladies d'esprit celle 
à qui plus de choses servent d'aliment, et 
moins de choses de remede."^
"Et en juge autant des espris; de ceux la 
commune façon, ils en ont beaucoup plus, 
et évidemment la brutalité y est sans com­
paraison plus rare; d 'ames singulières et 
du plus haut estage, nous ne leur en 
devons rien."5
The first possibility which these quotations present to 
the reader is that perhaps these words were only synonyms for 
the same concept. Perhaps it is only a matter of style, an 
effort at avoiding monotonous repetition. Yet, looking at 
the use of this term as it appears throughout the Essais, one 
does not really feel satisfied with this answer. There ap­
pears to be more to it than just style. One has the feeling
^"De l'institution des enfants," p. 159. 
3"De la phisionomie," pp. 1,015-1,016.
^"Sur des vers de Virgile," p. 842. 
^Ibid., p. 861.
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that this term actually represents an aspect or perhaps a 
particular function of the âme, or even the âme in its active 
state. In "Du pedantisme," the following was added in the 
1595 Edition; "Les boiteux sont mal propres aux exercises du 
corps; et aux exercises de l'esprit les ames boiteuses; les 
bastardes et vulgaires sont indignes de la philosophie."^
This would appear to the writer to make it an obvious fact 
that Montaigne is not equating the two terms, at least not 
in this instance.
One would be pressing the issue to say that Montaigne 
always uses the term "esprit" when he wishes to express the 
âme in movement, but on the other hand this seems to be the 
case in perhaps the majority of instances.. "L'esprit humain" 
is a "grand ouvrier de miracles,"? atheism which is a philo­
sophy establishes itself in the "humain esprit,the human 
"esprit" applies itself to m a t t e r .  ̂ All of these show move­
ment of some kind.
This fact becomes even more apparent when the author
makes a direct application of the terra to himself. Note the
following short excerpts ;
"Je me deffie des inventions de nostre esprit, 
de nostre science et art, en faveur duquel 
nous l'avons abandonnée et ses regies, et
G"Du pedantisme," pp. 140-141.
?"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 557. 
Sibid., p. 423.
9"De 1'institution des enfants," p. 155,
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auquel nous ne sçavons tenir moderation ny 
limite."10
"Je suis bien au contraire: j'ays l'esprit
tendre et facile à prendre l'essor. " H
"Mon stile et mon esprit vont vagabondant 
de mesmes."12
"Le plus fructueux et naturel exercice de 
nostre esprit, c'est à mon gré la conference."13
"Laissoy-je ma boyte chez moy, combien de 
soubçons et pensements espineux, et, qui pis 
est, incommunicables! J'avois tousjours 
l'esprit de ce costé."l^
"L'esprit, je l'avois lent, et qui n'alloit 
qu'autant qu'on le menoit."15
"J'ay l'esprit tardif et mousse; le moindre 
nuage luy arreste sa pointe, en façon que 
(pour exemple) je ne luy proposay jamais 
enigme si aisé qu'il sçeut desveloper."10
"Noz maistres ont tort dequoy, cherchant les 
causes des eslancements extraordinaires de 
nostre esprit, outre ce qu'ils en attribuent 
à un ravissement divin, à l'amour, à l'aspreté 
guerriere, à la poésie, au vin, ils n'en ont 
donné sa part à la santé."17
In all of these, the author is not presenting a staid
^^"De la ressemblance des enfants aux peres," p. 744.
^^"De 1'experience," p. 1,060.
^^"De la vanité," p. 973.
^^"De l'art de conférer," p. 900.
14"Que le goust des biens et des maux dépend en bonne 
partie de l'opinion que nous en avons," p. 65.
^^"De 1' institution des enfants," p. 174.
10"De la praesumption," p. 635.
17"Sur des vers de Virgile," p. 821.
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description, but the analysis of a movement which is, of 
course, being undertaken by the self, it is really this self 
which we have been discussing, but this self as it acts. In 
the "Apologie de Raimond Sebond," Montaigne narrows it even 
further, he says very plainly that it is a function of the 
âme :
"II est certain que nostre apprehension, nostre 
jugement et les facultés de nostre ame en 
general souffrent selon les mouvemens et altera­
tions du corps, lesquelles alterations sont 
continuelles. N'avons nous pas l'esprit plus 
esveille, la mémoire plus prompte, le discours 
plus vif en santé qu'en maladie?"^"
Whether this esprit be simply a function of the âme, or 
the ame itself in motion, or perhaps both, will not be decided 
here. The important concern is that it is somehow a concept 
separable from the âme, and hence can be discussed in its own 
right.
Although he maintains that a self must seek its content­
ment within, Montaigne exempts the esprit from this rule.
To him, it is destined to be ever in search of more knowledge, 
more avenues for activity. It is a sponge which can never be 
saturated, it must be forever beyond satisfaction if it is to 
continue to exist:
"II n'y a point de fin en nos inquisitions; 
nostre fin est en l'autre monde. C'est signe 
de racourciment d'esprit quand il se contente, 
ou de lassetê. Nul esprit généraux ne 
s'arreste en soy: il pretend tousjours et
va outre ses forces; il a des eslans au delà 
de ses effects; s'il ne s'avance et ne se
^^"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 547.
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presse et ne s'accule et ne se choque, il 
n'est vif qu'à demy."15
The contrast between this kind of thinking and 
Montaigne's theory of tranquility is a startling one. Yet, 
if this esprit is properly understood as representing, not the 
whole self, but a particular aspect of this self, there is no 
real conflict. This element is by its very nature active, 
active to the point of being feverish. It does not always 
act according to reason. Its relationship to other esprits 
and to their productions is a highly nervous one, subject to 
violent seizures and irrational behavior. It is that element 
in man which is rendered insane by the touch of the gods.
But even with all this, a well adjusted self can have such an 
esprit and still keep itself in a state of control and tran­
quility. It can sustain the outbursts of this erratic off­
spring and always draw it into its proper position in the 
make-up of the entire being. It is the principle of motion 
in a solid self.
Even though he recognized the necessity of an active and 
experimental esprit, Montaigne was not without misgivings 
about the danger which such an element could present to the 
happiness of the entire individual. "Nostre esprit est un 
util vagabond, dangereux et temeraire; il est malaisé d'y 
joindre l'ordre et la m e s u r e . "^0 And again: "On a raison de
19"De 1'experience," p. 1,045.
20"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 541.
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donner à l'esprit humain les barriers les plus contraintes 
qu'on peut."21
The author presents the reader with his fear of this 
element in no uncertain terms, citing his own personal expe­
riences as evidence of the havoc which could be reaped by it. 
When he withdrew into his tower, he had no course of action, 
no master plan, and so it ran wild. It was like a frenzied 
horse, running round in circles and losing itself.
"Si on ne les occupe (les esprits) à certain 
sujet, qui les bride et contraigne, ils se 
jettent desreiglez, par-cy, par 1%, dans le 
vague champ des imaginations.
Et n'est folie ny rêverie, qu'ils ne produisent 
en cette agitation."22
It is to this same esprit that Montaigne assigns the 
source of human unhappiness. He felt that it was, generally 
speaking, "desregie," always leading him away from the sensi­
ble path which nature had laid out for man. This may be one 
of the reasons behind his saying that man seemed to be double 
within himself, always in contention with himself.
The author of the Essais felt that this aspect of the 
self represented the major reason for the contentment and 
happiness which could be observed in animals, it was by 
nature well under control in them. Uncontrolled in man, it 
caused him to feel more pain and anxiety than he should. It 
was this same esprit which kept the members of the body from
Z^Ibid., p. 541.
22"De l'oisiveté," pp. 33-34.
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functioning as they should. It was, in a manner of speaking, 
Montaigne's concept of original sin. It is the great dis­
turber of the balance in mankind, that balance which can 
generally be observed in the rest of nature.
As one observes Montaigne's esprit in the course of its 
action, it becomes apparent that it represents in some way 
the idea of production, of giving birth. "Car ce que nous 
engendrons par l'ame, les enfantemens de nostre esprit, de 
nostre courage et suffisance, sont produits par une plus
9 onoble partie que la corporelle, et sont plus nostres..."
He is of course referring to his artistic endeavors, to his 
Essais. But there is still another production of the esprit 
which is very necessary for this artistic creation, and which 
represents that child of the esprit which he so feared. That 
is the imagination. It is primarily this factor which is the 
butt of his invectives, not the whole entity. He dedicated 
an entire essay to this difficult element. If man could only 
learn to live in the present instead of in a world created by 
imagination! If he could but learn to concern himself with 
the realities of life as they actually present themselves 
from day to day, rather than with the inventions of his imag­
ination! Here was the root of the greater part of his misery, 
not only his spiritual misery, but his physical as well. Like 
the âme itself, there is a very close relation between the 
happiness of the body and the functions of the esprit. Many
^^"De 1'affection des peres aux enfants," p. 380.
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of man's physical ills, real though they may be, have their 
roots in the imagination. This fact is borne out by the power 
that it has to cure so many of the physical problems which 
were discussed in the essay "De la force de l'imagination," 
and by the following statement. "II n'est rien plus vray- 
semble que la conformité et relation du corps à l'esprit.
While this element in the make-up of the self presented 
so many difficulties to the individual, it was at the same 
time a source of one of his greatest pleasures. It was with
this that he was able to experience beauty. It was this ir­
rational element which was overcome by the beauty of a crea­
tion, of a poem, of a literary masterpiece. It was never
intended that this be logical, only that it be kept under
some kind of control. When this control was being properly 
exercised, and when the self was in step with the natural 
order, all misgivings disappeared.
Very often Montaigne uses the term "esprit" to designate 
persons who are engaging in some intellectual endeavor, or in 
some creation. An author is an "esprit fameux," philoso­
phers are " e s p r i t s . People who are trying to outwit one 
another are "esprits."27 And so it goes time and time again.
24"De la phisionomie," p. 1,035.
^^"De I'art de conférer," p. 906.
^^"De l'institution des enfants," p. 147. 
"Apologie de Raimond Sebond," p. 567.
27"Que nostre désir s'accroit par la malaisance,"
p. 600.
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Montaigne's observation that the condition of the âme 
and the production of the esprit were apparently not related 
presented him with an enigma. He remarked that there were 
persons, well brought up, very learned, and normally quite 
noble in their conduct, who showed a very gross esprit, while 
there were certain people who were quite gross naturally but 
yet produced creations which implied a "bel e s p r i t . T h i s  
fact gave the esprit the appearance of perhaps being more in­
dependent from the âme than he had at first considered it to 
be. Or was it perhaps independent of tlie cultural structure 
which civilized western man had worked out? He finds pro­
ductions of the esprit even in primitive societies and thinks
2 Qthat perhaps somehow it might be related to nature.^ Perhaps 
a "bel esprit" is only following nature. This idea is prob­
ably inherent in all his thinking on this matter. The in­
stances in which he inveighs against its activities are 
instances in which he feels that they are causing the indi­
vidual to act in an unnatural manner.
Montaigne expressed some opinions about his own esprit 
which give a picture of at least how he construed this element 
in his own self. He relates that it was not entirely in 
hand, as perhaps it should have been. He writes that he pro­
duced tilings which shocked him and that he even writes in a 
manner which is strange even to himself. His esprit seems to
^^"Du pedantisme," pp. 132-133. 
Z^Ibid., p. 136.
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function in a manner known only to itself. It may well be 
that this aspect of the self completely defies understanding, 
or perhaps he does not know himself as well as he thought he 
did. All kinds of stimuli bring forth reactions, the sources 
of which he was unable to find within himself when he sought 
them out.̂  ̂
Montaigne's lack of memory enters into play in the func­
tioning of the esprit just as it did with the âme. He main­
tains that this deficiency has greatly helped him in its 
development, because, unlike other educated persons, his has 
not the resources at hand to enable him to act in a fashion 
learned from others. He cannot remember enough to imitate 
them, so he must rely on his own ingenuity. Despite the many 
quotations to be found in the Essais, Montaigne does not 
believe in copying, at least not ideas. He borrows only 
methods of expression.
The author of the Essais maintains that just as his âme 
has enough within itself upon which to exercise and with which 
to keep itself active, so too has his esprit. This he main­
tains to be in contrast with the majority who seek the greater 
part of their stimuli from outside sources. He only goes out­
side of himself to seek rest and repose, to allow himself some 
respite from his eternal scrutiny.
We have discussed Montaigne's feeling in general on the
30"Du parler prompt ou tardif," p. 41. 
^^"Des trois commerces," pp. 795-797.
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subject of the imagination and, feeling as strongly as he
did on this issue, it is only natural that he should mention
his own concern with it.
"Je suis de ceux qui sentent très-grand effort 
de l'imagination. Chacun en est heurté, mais 
aucuns en sont renversez. Son impression me 
perse. Et mon art est de luy eschapper, non 
pas de luy résister."32
He appears to have been somewhat over developed in this par­
ticular aspect. He relates that he can easily be devastated 
by the force of this thing and so he has resolved to flee it. 
He will not try to combat it. In this particular instance, 
Montaigne seems to be concerned with that aspect of the im­
agination which is termed "empathy." It would appear that 
he had a treraemdous capacity for this, and perhaps to aid 
himself, he narrates stories of people who were similarly 
afflicted. As we have stated, he saw the primary source of 
human misery in this imagination, and he found himself to be 
no exception to the rule.
We do not wish to leave the reader with the mistaken 
impression that the definitions and descriptions which we 
have given here are always applicable in every instance in 
which esprit is used in the Essais. There are many instances 
in which it appears to us that the term "esprit" coincides 
in definition with the term "âme." At times it is used sim­
ilarly to the English "ghost," at times it means life itself. 
What we maintain is that there does exist an entity which is
32"De la force de l'imagination," p. 95.
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treated by Montaigne and which is generally termed "esprit" 
by him; that this term can be described, has its own func­
tions and is another aspect of that totality which is the 
self.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS
It now seems apparent that the "moi" of Montaigne is 
not an entity which can be described with any single defini­
tion; rather, it is. a complex structure of co-functioning 
elements, any of which may be referred to in either a subjec­
tive or objective manner, depending upon the point of refer­
ence. These elements, the corps, the âme, the esprit, are 
all so interconnected as to allow the whole individual to 
identify so thoroughly with any one part that he no longer 
considers it the part, but rather the whole. In many respects, 
his handling of these elements which compose the self demon­
strate much that is commonly considered to be Freudian. With 
but a few reservations, it might be stated that Montaigne was 
a precursor of Freudian thinking, at least in a general way. 
There is a pronounced connection between Freud's and 
Montaigne's corps, between Freud's libido and Montaigne's 
innate tendencies, between the ego and the âne, and finally, 
between the superego and Montaigne's thinking on "culture" 
and coustume."^
Montaigne's classification, like that of Freud, is not
^Sigmund Freud, hn Outline of Psychoanalysis, Trans, 
by James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
1949) , pp. 13-45.
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completely satisfying, for there still remains a vacuum. If 
the âme or the ego is the object of study, there must be a 
subject in the study, there must be something which studies.
In the normal manner of thinking, it would appear necessary 
that the entity which is studying be distinct from the studied 
by the very nature of the process; that is, there must be an 
exchange between two realities, or at least two supposed 
realities. The observer is adding to his consciousness by 
his ability to perceive. He takes into his own world of 
reality aspects of another real world. Thus, if the aspects 
which he observes are already his own, there is no exchange, 
nothing is actually taking place. Even if one believes that 
a self is becoming conscious of its own realities, then the 
implication is that there is still another world of realities, 
the conscious as opposed to the unconscious. If this is the 
case, one is still left with two entities, the observer and 
the observed. So it is that the conscious agent can be 
pushed back beyond the realm of the âme into an area all its 
own. This area, this entity we might call the ultimate self, 
the "moi" which is by nature completely subjective. Psycho­
logists refer to this situation as "the squinting substan-
2tive and the objective ego." It is also this ultimate
2Peter A. Bertocci, "The psychological self, the ego, 
the personality," from: The Self in Growth, Teaching, and
Learning: Selected Readings, ed. by Don E. Hamachek (Engle­
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1965), p. 17.
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principle which appears to be the unifying agent in a highly 
volatile self.^
Unfortunately, as was stated at the beginning of this 
study, this purely subjective element appears to have been 
beyond Montaigne's reach, and so it has been beyond our reach. 
What we have done is observe this ultimate self as it mani­
fested itself to the author of the Essais. We do not pre­
tend to have disclosed all of its observable parts, but we 
do believe that its major components have been determined by 
this study. It is our conclusion that, despite the fact that 
there are two observable divisions which are termed âme and 
corps, the essential observable self may be considered to be 
the âme, for it lies closer to that entity which we are unable 
to reach. It is to this âme that one must look if he is to 
find answers basic to the self. It is in this element that 
realities are to be found, at least the only ones of which 
the individual may have any certainty at all. The truth of 
the external world is forever hidden from the individual 
because of his inability to receive absolute external impres­
sions by way of his senses. Everything that he perceives is 
relative to what he already is.
This âme is an entity which is necessarily always in 
motion, lack of movement is death. But this motion must not 
be understood to result in any kind of essential change, for 
it is a unity which has a compelling drive to develop itself.
^Ibid., p. 19.
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its unique self. It is always individual and distinct from 
any other, due to some natural but somewhat mysterious innate 
tendencies. In its quest for development, the self is in 
need of means whereby it might examine itself. Self-expres­
sion and communication are adopted as the natural implemen­
tation of this need. Prior to any progress in development, 
it is necessary that the self achieve freedom, freedom in its 
purest sense.
There appears to be a specialization of functions for 
each of the two major divisions studied. To the corps 
Montaigne generally attributed those actions which were 
automatic and several others, such as rhetoric and speech, 
and even love. Generally speaking, the human passions have 
their source in the âme, but there are some which stem 
entirely from the corps. The method for determining the 
origin is based on a rather simple rule which maintains that 
those passions which are fulfilled in their exercising are 
of the corps ; those which are insatiable and which increase 
in their demands by practice are of the âme. Other functions 
which were found to relate primarily to the âme were those 
which come under the heading of intellectual creation, com­
munication and the exercise of free will. Perhaps the great­
est of thsse might be determined as,the exercise of free will, 
the greatest and the most difficult act which the âme has to 
perform. It appears that in the final analysis this is the 
great quest in the Essais; the quest for freedom, an almost 
impossible venture.
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Even though the self has the potentiality for complete 
freedom, there is one option which it must not or at least 
should not take, and that is the decision to direct itself 
along a path which is contrary to its natural leanings. Such 
a mode of conduct on its part will lead to disastrous conse­
quences .
We conclude, as well, that Montaigne felt that the self 
would be good naturally, and contented as well, if it could 
but find the means for recognizing its own position in the 
universal order, and if, once having found its position, it 
would live in accordance with these findings. It would ap­
pear to us that the negative aspects of Montaigne's thinking 
in this area have been over stressed. He did, in fact, say 
that man was a miserable creature, but he was speaking of the 
actual men he observed around him, of men whose lives he 
found narrated in books. This was still not the natural man, 
for to him, like everything in nature, human nature was good. 
The sad fact of the matter is simply that most men have 
never found their true position in nature, a fault which must 
not be laid against the nature of the individual, but against 
his own will, or against his society.
Actually, the specific element in the self which seems 
to be primarily responsible for this erring is that part or 
aspect of the âme which we have termed "esprit." It is this 
particular entity or facet which houses ambition and the 
unfulfillable dreams of the individual. It is with this 
creative aspect of the self that the fault lies for the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 3 1
self's deviations. But this need not be so, for it is con­
trollable by what we have termed "the ultimate subjective 
self." It may, when under control, become one of the great­
est elements in the individual's make-up. In fact, it is 
capable of representing the self in an even more significant 
manner than does the âme itself.
For the author of the Essais, there were certain mani­
festations which clearly indicated the presence of a good 
self. It was sincere, detesting all falsehood as foreign 
and incompatible to itself; it was simple in its actions and 
in its motives; it was humane in its relations with its 
fellow man; it was orderly and tranquil in the conduct of its 
own life; it stood alone, not needing to lean on anything 
outside itself; it was mediocre, espousing none of the tem­
porary "isms" of its times; it was adaptable, tied to nothing 
without which it would be unable to continue to live in a 
happy manner; finally, it demonstrated that it was not for­
eign to the general conduct of the natural order. With all 
of this a wise man came into existence.
We feel that Montaigne has described his progress toward 
goodness, not divine goodness, but human goodness. It is to 
this latter state that most men are called, divinely so.
The quest for virtue is yet another "essai."
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